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ABSTRACT

Recently dominant sets, a generalization of the notion of the maximal clique to edgeweighted graphs, have proven to be an effective tool for unsupervised learning and have
found applications in different domains. Although, they were initially established using
optimization and graph theory concepts, recent work has shown fascinating connections
with evolutionary game theory, that leads to the clustering game framework. However,
considering size of today’s data sets, existing methods need to be modified in order to handle
massive data. Hence, in this research work, first we address the limitations of the clustering
game framework for large data sets theoretically. We propose a new important question for
the clustering community “How can a cluster of a subset of a dataset be a cluster of the
entire dataset?”. We show that, this problem is a coNP-hard problem in a clustering game
framework. Thus, we modify the definition of a cluster from a stable concept to a non-stable
but optimal one (Nash equilibrium). By experiments we show that this relaxation does not
change the qualities of the clusters practically.
Following this alteration and the fact that equilibriums are generally compact subsets
of vertices, we design an effective strategy to find equilibriums representing well distributed
clusters. After finding such equilibriums, a linear game theoretic relation is proposed to
assign vertices to the clusters and partition the graph. However, the method inherits a

vii

space complexity issue, that is the similarities between every pair of objects are required
which proves practically intractable for large data sets. To overcome this limitation, after
establishing necessary theoretical tools for a special type of graphs that we call vertexrepeated graphs, we propose the scalable clustering game framework. This approach divides
a data set into disjoint tractable size chunks. Then, the exact clusters of the entire data
are approximated by the clusters of the chunks. In fact, the exact equilibriums of the entire
graph is approximated by the equilibriums of the subsets of the graph. We show theorems
that enable significantly improved time complexity for the model. The applications include,
but are not limited to, the maximum weight clique problem, large data clustering and image
segmentation. Experiments have been done on random graphs and the DIMACS benchmark
for the maximum weight clique problem and on magnetic resonance images (MRI) of the
human brain consisting of about 4 million examples for large data clustering. Also, on the
Berkeley Segmentation Dataset, the proposed method achieves results comparable to the
state of the art, providing a parallel framework for image segmentation and without any
training phase. The results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
In another part of this research work, we generalize the clustering game method to
cluster uncertain data where the similarities between the data points are not exactly known,
that leads to the uncertain clustering game framework. Here, contrary to the ensemble
clustering approaches, where the results of different similarity matrices are combined, we
focus on the average utilities of an uncertain game. We show that the game theoretical
solutions provide stable clusters even in the presence of severe uncertainties. In addition,

viii

based on this framework, we propose a novel concept in uncertain data clustering so that
every subset of objects can have a “cluster degree”. Extensive experiments on real world data
sets, as well as on the Berkeley image segmentation dataset, confirm the performance of the
proposed method.
And finally, instead of dividing a graph into chunks to make the clustering scalable,
we study the effect of the spectral sparsification method based on sampling by effective
resistance on the clustering outputs. Through experimental and theoretical observations,
we show that the clustering results obtained from sparsified graphs are very similar to the
results of the original non-sparsified graphs. The rand index is always at about 0.9 to 0.99
in our experiments even when lots of sparsification is done.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

Clustering is an important approach to unsupervised learning widely used in pattern
recognition, data mining and other related fields. It has been addressed by researchers
in different disciplines. A vast collection of algorithms [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] have been
developed in the literature in order to improve existing methods for different applications such
as image segmentation [8, 11, 12], document grouping [13, 14], bioinformatics [15, 16, 17], etc.
We distinguish between two main clustering algorithms; feature-based and similarity-based.
In feature based methods [2, 3, 6], objects are expressed as points in a metric space, while
in similarity-based methods [8, 18, 19, 20], they are described directly by their similarity
relations. Recently, similarity-based methods have become considerably important because
of the many application domains where it is not possible to obtain satisfactory features, but
a measure of similarity is available [21].
A classical approach in similarity based clustering is to use the concepts and approaches from graph theory [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 9, 18, 27, 28, 29]. The data are mapped
to the vertices/nodes of a graph such that edge weights are proportional to the similarities between objects of the corresponding nodes. Hence, these approaches map clustering
problems to graph theoretic ones for which powerful algorithms have been developed. Generally, graph theoretic methods consist of searching for certain combinatorial structures in the
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graph. Graph search methods include minimum spanning trees [23], spectral graph methods
[8, 30, 31, 24], and clique finding approaches [26]. The graph as a whole structure represents
very complex relations among the objects. A class of graph-based approaches to unsupervised learning are the spectral clustering methods [32]. These approaches find partitions of
a data set using information from the eigenvectors of the similarity matrix, or the matrices
related to it. In pattern recognition and computer vision, the work of Shi and Malik [8] on
normalized cuts was very influential. The best of the current approaches to find clusters are
still based on variations of this approach [12]. Generally, spectral clustering techniques can
be considered as effective heuristics, but they do not represent an exact combinatorial explanation and are not described with an exact global cost function. Also, spectral clustering
approaches encounter a quadratic resource bottleneck when the number of data instances is
large. It requires significant time and memory to compute the Eigen space of the Laplacian
matrix of a graph.
Unlike spectral graph methods that partition a graph into sub partitions, a different
perspective to pairwise clustering is by means of finding dense subgraphs. A set of vertices
that represent a complex relation usually form a dense subgraph. These approaches are focused on finding dense subgraphs instead of partitioning the graph into several sub partitions
such that the union of all sub partitions is the graph. Dense subgraphs are widely used in
various fields, such as finding the community structure in social and biological networks [27],
foreground-background image segmentation [33], one-class classification when searching for a
coherent subset of objects in a large pool of objects [34], etc. Dense subgraphs usually iden-
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tify cliques of vertices that are highly related to each other. In particular, a maximal clique in
a graph is the most strongest definition of a dense subgraph [26]. The resulting cohesiveness
in a maximal clique is unlikely to be constructed randomly and is also not easily affected
by noise. Thus, a maximal clique robustly indicates a key underlying pattern of a graph
[35]. Foundational work was done by Motzkin and Straus [36] who proved that solving the
maximum clique problem is equivalent to finding the global solution of a quadratic function
over the simplex. The result was generalized to edge-weighted graphs in [9] by the notion of
a dominant set. A dominant set is a subset of input data satisfying the constraint of internal
homogeneity and external in-homogeneity. More importantly, the authors in [9] provided a
mathematically well established relation between graph clustering (dominant sets), standard
quadratic programming (StQP) and evolutionary game theory (EGT). In fact, the clustering
problem can be cast into a non-cooperative game, namely the “clustering game” [19]. The
clustering game model has found successful applications in various domains such as image
segmentation [9, 37], bioinformatics [16, 17], object detection and classification [38, 39, 40],
face recognition [41], etc. One of the main attractive features offered by the clustering game
that distinguishes it from other approaches, is its generality as it allows one to naturally deal
with similarities that are not necessarily reflected by a Euclidean distance measure, or may
not even obey the conditions of a metric.
However, the main challenge in the clustering game is that similarity values between
every pair of vertices are needed. In fact, if the similarity between two vertices is zero,
then they can not be in a cluster together. This issue makes the dominant set framework
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impractical with respect to space complexity for clustering large data sets. The main focus
of this research work is to address these problems theoretically, and to provide practical
solutions for different scenarios. Our contributions in this dissertation are briefly described
below.

1. First of all, we propose a new important question “How can a cluster of a subset of a
dataset be a cluster of the entire dataset?”. We show that, this problem is a coNP-hard
problem in the clustering game framework. This observation leads us to modify the
definition of a cluster from a stable concept (ESS) to a non-stable but optimal one
(Nash equilibrium) that makes it computationally practical to find clusters in graphs
with large numbers of vertices.
2. We propose a simple, yet effective strategy to search the solution space in order to find
well distributed clusters in a subgraphs.
3. Then, to scale up the clustering game method, we developed a mathematically established approach for clustering large graphs. Extensive simulations on graph benchmarks
and an image segmentation problem validate the method.
4. Also, we build up a novel game theoretic framework for clustering uncertain relational
data, where the similarities between the objects are not exactly known.
5. Finally, we deployed the spectral sparsification technique using sampling by effective
resistance to alleviate the inherent time complexity problem of spectral clustering. We
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showed that the clusters of a sparsified graph can approximate the clusters of the
original graph very well with theoretical results as well as experimental justification.

1.1

Dissertation Overview
Chapter 2 describes the essentials of the clustering game method in details and dis-

cussed the prior works in the literature. Chapter 3 demonstrates the hypothesis that a Nash
equilibrium would be more effective than ESS clusters to deal with large graphs. Theoretical
results shows that determining whether a cluster of a subgraph is a cluster of the entire graph
is a challenging problem. In Chapter 4, we propose a novel method to search the simplex,
i.e. the space of the probability vectors, in order to find clusters either when the number
of clusters is known or unknown. Chapter 5 develops a scalable clustering game framework
that can be implemented using parallel processing, to reduce the computational complexity
of the original clustering game. Chapter 6 formulates an uncertain clustering game model for
uncertain data. We determine the possibility of the result by giving a sense about its quality
and an intuition of how likely discovered clusters are to be similar to the actual clusters when
applied to the true (but unknown) data points. Finally, Chapter 7 investigates the effect of
spectral sparsification of graphs when using spectral clustering methods.
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CHAPTER 2 : BACKGROUND ON CLUSTERING GAMES

Let G = (V, E) be an unweighted graph, where V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vn } is the set of
vertices and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges. The adjacency matrix of G is the n × n
symmetric matrix AG = (aij ) such that aij is 1 when there is an edge between the vertex i
and the vertex j, and 0 when there is no edge. Also, we denote an edge-weighted graph by
G = (V, ΘE ), where ΘE : V × V → R+ is the (positive) weight function over the edges. The
symmetric similarity matrix of the edge-weighted graph G is denoted by A = (aij ), where

aij = ΘE vi , vj .
The graph-based clustering approaches map a data set to the vertices of a graph such
that edge weights are proportional to the similarities between objects of the corresponding
nodes. In particular, consider a set of n numerical objects O = {o1 , o2 , . . . , on }, where each
object oi contains p features (dimensions) represented by a vector fi = (fi1 , fi2 , ..., fip )T ∈ Rp .
One of the common ways to measure the similarity between ith and jth example is by means
of Guassian kernel fuction, i.e. aij = exp(−kfi − fj k22 /σ 2 ), where σ is a scaling factor. The
adjacency matrix of an unweighted graph where the weights of the edges are 0 or 1, is
typically derived from the similarity matrix by thresholding.
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2.1
2.1.1

Graph Clustering and Standard Quadratic Programming (StQP)
Maximal Cliques in Unweighted Edge Graphs
Taking into account that a cluster is a group of objects having more similarity to one

another than objects not in the cluster, some authors [26] argued that a maximal clique in
an unweighted graph is equivalent to the definition of a cluster. A subset of vertices is called
a clique if all of its vertices are connected to each other. A clique is called maximal, if it is
not a subset of other cliques. The maximal clique with maximum cardinality is called the
maximum clique.
Let G = (V, E) be an unweighted graph, and the characteristic vector for a subset of
C
n
vertices C ⊆ V , xC = (xC
1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ R , with cardinality |C| is defined as

xC
i =





1

 |C|

if vi ∈ C





0

otherwise

(2.1)

Motzkin and Straus in [36] established a relationship between the characteristic vector of a maximum clique problem (MCP) and the following quadratic program called the
Motzkin-Straus program
max
x

f (x) = xT A x
(2.2)

subject to x ∈ ∆n
where ∆n = {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0,

Pn

i=1

xi = 1} is the standard simplex, and A is the same as an

n × n symmetric adjacency matrix AG of graph G. They proved that the clique number of a
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graph G, i.e. the cardinality of the maximum clique, can be found using the global solution
of (2.2). However, there exist spurious solutions of the original Motzkin-Straus formulation
in which maximizers are not in the form of the characteristic vectors [42]. Consequently,
Bomze [35] provided a one-to-one correspondence between local maximizers of (2.2) with
A = AG + αI and the characteristic vectors of the maximal cliques of G, where 0 < α < 1
and I is the identity matrix. Also, Bomze showed that all local maximizers of (2.2) with
A = AG + αI are strict.

2.1.2

Dominant Sets in Edge-Weighted Graphs
Inspired by maximal clique-based clustering of an unweighted edge graph, Pavan and

Pelillo in [9] generalized the notion of a maximal clique to edge-weighted graphs by means
of a dominant set. A dominant set is a subset of vertices that have two main characteristics
of a cluster; internal homogeneity and external in-homogeneity; the elements belonging to a
dominant set have high mutual similarities and the overall internal coherency decreases by
introducing external elements to a dominant set. Dominant set clustering provides a measure
of cluster cohesiveness as well as a degree of belonging of every vertex to each cluster.
Let S ⊆ V be a subset of vertices of an edge-weighted graph. The average weighted
degree of vi ∈ V with regard to S is defined as

awdeg S (vi ) =

1 X
aij
|S| v ∈S
j
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(2.3)

If vj ∈
/ S, then a measure which reflects the relative similarity between nodes vj and
vi with regard to the average similarity between node vi and its neighbors in S is


φS vi , vj = aij − awdeg S (vi )

(2.4)

Also, the weight of vi ∈ S with regard to S is defined as

wS (vi ) =







1







if |S| = 1
(2.5)


P

φS\{vi } vj , vi wS\{i} (vj ) otherwise

vj ∈S\{vi }

where \ denotes the set difference. The total weight of S is

W (S) =

X

wS (vi )

(2.6)

vi ∈S

Following the above definitions, in [9], a non empty subset of vertices S ⊆ V such
that W (T ) > 0 for any non-empty subset T ⊆ S, is defined as a dominant set if it has the
following two conditions:

1. wS (vi ) > 0, for all vi ∈ S.
2. wS∪{vi } (vi ) < 0, for all vi ∈
/ S.

It can be seen that conditions 1 and 2 correspond to the two main characteristics of a
cluster, i.e. internal homogeneity and external in-homogeneity, respectively. In addition, the

9

way a dominant set is defined has an intriguing relation to quadratic programming in (2.2)
[9]. Indeed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between dominant sets of an edge-weighted
graph with similarity matrix A and strict local maximizers of (2.2); if x is a strict local
solution of program (2.2) with A being a similarity matrix of an edge-weighted graph, then
its support D = σ(x) will be a dominant set, where σ (x) = {i xi > 0} is the set of non-zero
elements of x.

2.2

Clustering Game
Recently, a novel connection between dominant sets clustering and evolutionary game

theory was established, namely a clustering game [9, 35, 43, 44, 45]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
workflow of a clustering game. Dominant sets have been linked to game theory by borrowing
concepts and solutions from StQP, showing that they can be characterized in terms of a
classic equilibrium concept known as an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) of a particular
non-cooperative game which is constructed from the objects of the clustering problem. The
main idea behind a clustering game is to consider the clustering problem as a non-cooperative
game between two players. A set of data objects is mapped into a two-player game such
that the players simultaneously select an object. Then, the players get a reward based on
their choice that is proportional to the similarity of the chosen objects. Since clusters are
sets of objects that are highly similar, the players coordinate to select objects from the same
cluster in order to gain a high reward. In fact, the players implicitly learn a common notion
of a cluster by repeatedly playing the game over time. At the end of the learning task, an
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Figure 2.1: The workflow of a clustering game. (a) There is a 1-1 correspondence between
dominant sets, a strict local solution of the corresponding quadratic problem and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the corresponding game. Replicator dynamics can be used
to find ESSs. (b) The simplex and the trajectories of a dynamics on the simplex.
equilibrium will be achieved where both players reach a common belief about a cluster. From
this standpoint, evolutionary game theory provides us with formalizations of this selection
mechanism, and a dominant set turns out to be equivalent to an ESS. To further analyze
how the clustering game works, we review the main concepts and definitions in evolutionary
game theory.

2.2.1

Essentials of Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory studies the behavior of large populations of individuals

who repeatedly interact in a strategic manner. The population changes over time either by a
natural selection mechanism based on birth and death rates, or using some myopic decision
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rules adopted by individuals. Evolutionary game theory was introduced in a series of papers
by mathematical biologist John Maynard Smith [46, 47]. He used the methods of classical
game theory, which mainly models the behavior of rational economic agents, in the context
of biological studies. In evolutionary game theory, the players are repeatedly drawn from a
random infinite population to play the game. Players are not assumed to play rationally,
with rationality replaced by evolutionary stability. The aim is to study the evolution of the
different strategies in the population according to a behavioral pattern.
Let us consider a large population of individuals who are randomly matched to play a
symmetric two-player game. Each player plays a certain pure strategy from the strategy set
S = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In addition, let A be the n × n symmetric payoff matrix, which assigns a
utility aij to a player playing strategy i against a player playing strategy j. The state of the
population can be represented by a vector x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn )T ∈ ∆n , where xi corresponds
to the fraction of individuals in the population playing strategy i, such that Σni=1 xi = 1. The
state of the population is simply a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies,
which is formally identical to a mixed strategy.

2.2.1.1

Nash Equilibrium

The expected payoff received for a player using mixed strategy y against an opponent
playing mixed strategy x is uA (y, x) = y T Ax. The best responses against a mixed strategy x
are the set of mixed strategies β(x) = {y ∈ ∆n |uA (y, x) = maxz uA (z, x)}. A mixed strategy
x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is the best response to itself, i.e. x ∈ β(x). This
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implies that for all i ∈ σ(x) = {i ∈ S|xi > 0} which is called the support of mixed strategy
x, uA (ei , x) = uA (x, x) where ei is a vector of an approperiate size with entry i equal to
one and all other entries equal to zero. In other words, the payoff for every strategy in the
support of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium x is the same as uA (x, x), while all strategies
outside the support of x earn a payoff less than or equal to uA (x, x).

2.2.1.2

Evolutionary Stable Strategy

Now, assume that the population plays an incumbent mixed strategy x and a small
group of mutants enter this population and adopt a different mixed strategy y. Let the
share of mutants in the post entry population be , where  ∈ (0, 1) (although  can be
any number in the unit interval, the share of the mutants is typically a very small number).
Hence, if an individual is uniformly drawn from the population, then the probability that
the opponent will play the incumbent strategy x is (1 − ), whereas the probability that
he will play the mutant strategy y is . Hence, the post entry payoff for the incumbent
and mutant strategies are uA (x, w) and uA (y, w), respectively, where w = y + (1 − )x.
Biological assumptions suggest that evolutionary forces select the incumbent strategy against
the mutant strategy, if the mutant post entry payoff is lower than that of the incumbent
strategy, i.e. uA (x, w) > uA (y, w). In this regard, a mixed strategy x is called an Evolutionary
Stable Strategy (ESS) if this inequality holds for any mutant strategy y 6= x where the
population share  is sufficiently small. Specifically, a mixed strategy x is an ESS if and only
if [48]
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1. It is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. uA (y, x) ≤ uA (x, x), ∀y ∈ ∆n (equilibrium condition).
2. If uA (y, x) = uA (x, x), then uA (y, y) < uA (x, y) (stability condition).
The equilibrium condition states that non mutants get a payoff against themselves
at least as large as mutants achieve. Otherwise, in a population consisting mainly of non
mutants, non mutants will tend to perish while mutants will survive. On the other hand,
if both perform equally well, i.e. the stability condition, non mutants would be able to
perform better against mutants than mutants do against themselves. Otherwise, the mutant
would reproduce faster than the non mutant since they will have greater payoff than the non
mutant by playing against themselves as well as have the same reproductive success as non
mutants when playing with non mutants.

2.2.2

Evolutionary Dynamics for Finding Equilibria
There has been growing interest in the computational aspects of finding a Nash equi-

librium. It is well known that the problem of finding an equilibrium belongs to the PPADcomplete problems, a subclass of NP hard problems [49, 50]. Here, we use the well-established
evolutionary game theory approaches, due to the nature of the clustering game formulation.
However, we mention that there exist other approaches in the literature such as the enumeration of support methods [51, 52], simplicial subdivision methods [53] and continuation
methods [54].
In order to find an equilibrium, we need to specify some selection mechanisms that
effectively lead the population to an equilibrium. This mechanism spreads the fittest strate-
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gies through the population and removes the weakest one, similar to a Darwinian selection
process. From another point of view, rather than considering a selection mechanism that
modifies the distribution of strategies, one may think of a revision protocol that every individual follows. Here, we explain three main evolutionary dynamic approaches studied in the
literature.

2.2.2.1

Replicator Dynamics

The well-known selection process that mimics a Darwinian selection process over the
set of pure strategies, is replicator dynamics [48]. It is found that the evolutionary replicator
dynamics can arise from certain models of human learning [55]. The discrete-time replicator
dynamics is stated as follows
xt+1
= xti
i

uA (ei , xt )
uA (xt , xt )

(2.7)

where xt and xti are x and xi at time t, respectively.
Here, we review some important characteristics of replicator dynamics as one of the
most common tools to find equilibriums: let’s assume that the payoff matrix A is symmetric.
Replicator dynamics or generally any payoff monotonic dynamics [56] initialized from any
point in the simplex will converge to a fixed point, since the average population payoff,
uA (x, x), is monotonically increasing. These obtained limit points are not necessarily Nash
equilibriums. However, when the replicator dynamics is initialized from the interior of the
simplex represented by int(∆n ) = {x ∈ ∆n |xi > 0, ∀i}, it will converge to fixed points
which are necessarily Nash equilibriums and equivalently KKT points. However, not all
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Nash equilibria are local maximizers or strict ones. On the other hand, we know that
asymptotically stable points of replicator dynamics are strict local maximizers of the average
payoff function, and are ESSs. In other words, x ∈ ∆n is asymptotically stable under
replicator dynamics if and only if x is a strict local maximizer of (2.2), and if and only if
x is an ESS for the equivalent symmetric game [9]. In addition, Lyapunov stable points of
replicator dynamics are local maximizers of the average payoff function, and are neutrally
stable strategies (NSSs). In this regard, replicator dynamics guarantee convergence to Nash
equilibria, not local or strict maximizers, but because the local minimizers and saddle points
are not stable, by perturbing the initial point of the trajectory the problem of ending in a
local or strict maximizer can be solved. However, one may ask why use replicator dynamics,
if it can converge to local maximas. In general the occurrence of a non-strict local solution
is limited to payoff matrices with particular structures. As soon as you introduce a small
perturbation of the weights you end up with strict local maxima. Alternatively, one could
add a small regularization term to force strict solutions.
Based on the above analysis, if the replicator dynamics is initialized from a point
not in the interior of the simplex (i.e. it is initialized from one of the faces of the simplex),
then the obtained fixed point is not a KKT point. This property prevents us from using
replicator dynamics in order to deal with subgraphs. Particularly, assume that we would
like to initialize the replicator dynamics from a small subset of vertices. In that case, the
dynamics won’t converge to a KKT point of the entire graph. In other words, if one of the
elements of the vector x at time t becomes zero, e.g. xti = 0, it will be zero evermore.
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2.2.2.2

Path Following Replicator Dynamics

Despite the success of replicator dynamics in finding equilibriums, one is generally
interested to find the equilibrium with the highest support (equivalently, the maximum
clique). Although replicator dynamics converges to a KKT point that most likely is a local
maximum, this point may be not the global maximum of (2.2). In fact, it is often sensitive to
the degree distribution of a graph, and usually biased by vertices with large degrees [36], thus
preventing the equilibrium with the highest support. To overcome this problem, the authors
in [57] introduced a dynamic parameter  (path parameter) into the evolution process of the
replicator dynamics. They solved a series of optimization problems in the following form

max
x

f (x) = xT A x
(2.8)

subject to x ∈

where ∆n = {x ∈ Rn |0 ≤ xi ≤ ,

P

∆n

xi = 1} is a subset of simplex ∆n . Using this objective

function, they gradually increase  so that the local maximizer is more likely to be the global
maximizer of (2.2).
In fact, the path following replicator dynamics is a direct generalization of discrete
replicator dynamics (when  = 1, then they are the same), and it has some advantages. First,
its evolution process is less sensitive to the degree distribution of the vertices compared to the
discrete replicator dynamics, and thus it mainly depends on the overall structure of graph.
Second, the path parameter  can control the size of the obtained equilibrium. Precisely,
there are at least d 1 e elements in the support of x. For example, if we want to find a dense

17

cluster of size at least k (a typical application of this is the densest k-subgraph problem), we
can set  = k1 .

2.2.2.3

Best Response Dynamics and Fictitious Play

In best response dynamics, players adjust their strategies at any given time to strategies that are the best responses to the current strategies of their opponents. In other words,
players estimate their opponents’ strategies in the future from their past play and then
choose a strategy which is a best response to this estimate. In the continuous case, the best
response dynamics can be written as

ẋ = β(x) − x

(2.9)

The discrete time best response dynamics has gained a lot of interest in the algorithmic
game theory field. Best response dynamics is a perfect fit for a specific type of games called
potential games [58]. Basically, in a finite potential game, from an arbitrary initial strategy
of the players, the best response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
The fictitious play dynamics is the very first dynamics ever studied. The fictitious play
is simply an Euler discretization procedure with diminishing stepsizes of a certain continuous
time process [59]. Consider a population of individuals, where new individuals are added to
the population iteratively. The new entrant plays a fixed pre-programmed strategy which is
a best response to the mixed strategies of the current population for the rest of the game.
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In particular, the new individual plays strategy st+1 ∈ β(xt ), where xt =

Pt

i=1

si /t. As a

result, the discrete time fictitious play is given by

xt+1 =

rt+1 − xt
+ xt
t+1

(2.10)

where rt+1 ∈ β(xt ).

2.2.2.4

Infection and Immunization Dynamics

In order to overcome some computational problems of standard evolutionary dynamics, a new class of evolutionary dynamics called InImDyn (Infection and Immunization
Dynamics) was introduced in [60, 61, 62]. The dynamics is motivated by the infection and
immunization processes. The selection mechanism iteratively performs an infection step,
which consists of spreading the most successful strategies in the population (or suppressing
the most unsuccessful strategies). The infection phase is extended as long as the selected infection strategy performs better than the average population’s payoff. Consider the strategy
selection function Spure (x) which finds a pure strategy i maximizing |uA (ei , x)−uA (x, x)| and
returns ei ,

xi
(e −x)+x
xi −1 i

or x according to whether i ∈ τ+ (x) = {j ∈ S|uA (ej , x) > uA (x, x)},

i ∈ τ− (x) = {j ∈ S|uA (ej , x) < uA (x, x)} ∩ σ(x) or i ∈ σ0 (x) = {j ∈ S|uA (ej , x) − uA (x, x) =
0}. Specifically, let M (x) be a pure strategy such that

M (x) ∈ arg max{uA (ei − x) − uA (x, x)|i ∈ τ+ (x)} ∪ {uA (x, x) − uA (ei , x)|i ∈ τ− (x) ∩ σ(x)}
(2.11)
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Then the dynamic is defined as

xt+1 = δ̂Spure (xt ) (xt )[Spure (xt ) − xt ] + xt

where

S(x) =

and
δ̂y (x) =







ei






(2.12)

if i = M (x) ∈ τ+ (x)
(2.13)

xi
(ei − x) + x if i = M (x) ∈ τ− (x) ∩ σ(x)

xi −1








otherwise
x





A (y,x)

min[1, uAu(x,x)−u
] if uA (y − x, y − x) < 0
A (y−x,y−x)




1

.

(2.14)

otherwise

This dynamic provides nice properties compared to replicator dynamics [60]. Every
fixed point of this dynamic is a Nash equilibrium and vice versa. In other words, any
trajectory starting in ∆ (not only its interior) converges to a Nash equilibrium. Also, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between ESSs and the asymptotically stable points of InImDyn.
In addition, from a computational viewpoint, every iteration is linear in the number of
strategies of the game compared to the quadratic one for an iteration in replicator dynamics.

2.3

Game Theoretic Viewpoint of Maximal Cliques and Dominant Sets
Now consider problem (2.2) again. In [35], a relation between ESS and the quadratic

program (2.2) was established, such that x is the ESS of a two player game with payoff

20

matrix A if and only if it is a strict local solution of problem (2.2). Based on this observation, the whole picture in Figure 2.1 for the clustering game is now clear: maximal cliques
and dominant sets for unweighted and edge-weighted graphs, respectively, are in one-to-one
correspondence with the strict local solutions of the corresponding problem (2.2). On the
other hand, strict local solutions of problem (2.2) are the ESS of the corresponding game.
As a result,

1. For unweighted graphs: the nonzero elements of an ESS of a game with payoff matrix
A = AG + αI (0 < α < 1) are a maximal clique of the unweighted graph G with
adjacency matrix AG .
2. For edge-weighted graphs: the nonzero elements of an ESS of a game with payoff matrix
A are a dominant set of the edge-weighted graph G with similarity matrix A.

2.4
2.4.1

Clustering Game Extensions
Hyper-Graph Clustering Game
In the previous sections, we considered pairwise similarities between the objects to be

clustered. However in some situations, the cluster structure is more complex and considering
them as pairwise similarities would lose information. Thus, higher-order similarities between
the objects need to be assumed in order to cluster the objects. For instance, consider
clustering d-dimensional Euclidean data points into several lines. Clearly, since every pair
of data points constitute a line, a meaningful measure of pairwise similarity does not exist
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for this problem. On the other hand, one can define a measure of similarity between every
triplets of data points measuring how close they are to be collinear.
Similar to modeling pairwise similarities in terms of edge-weighted graphs, higherorder similarities can be modeled in terms of edge-weighted hyper-graphs. A hyper-graph
is a generalized graph in which each edge (hyper-edge) can connect any number of vertices.
The problem of clustering objects using higher-order similarities is called the hyper-graph
clustering problem. In the pattern recognition community, there has been increasing interest
around this problem [63, 64, 65, 20]. Most of the approaches to hypergraph clustering are
partition based where the number of partitions is fixed. Hence, these approaches are not
useful for applications when 1) the number of clusters is not known in advance, 2) the data
set contains clutter elements (as in figure/ground image segmentation problems), 3) clusters
are not necessarily disjoint sets, i.e. we might have overlapping clusters such as in line
clustering problems.
As a result, in [41], the authors proposed a radically different perspective to the
hyper-graph clustering problem using evolutionary game theory. In contrast with game
theoretic pairwise clustering, the hyper-graph clustering problem is casted into a multiplayer
clustering game. In this framework, the notion of a cluster turns out to be an equilibrium
of the modeled multiplayer clustering game. To extract the clusters, the powerful class of
dynamical systems based on the Baum-Eagon inequality [66] that generalizes the classical
replicator dynamics was used as follows. Let Q(x) be a homogeneous polynomial in the
variables xi with nonnegative coefficients, and let x ∈ ∆. Now based on the Baum-Eagon
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inequality, Q(M(x)) > Q(x) (unless M(x) = x) for the mapping z = M(x) from ∆ to itself
that is defined as follows

n

zi = xi

∂Q(x) . X ∂Q(x)
xl
∂xi
∂xl
l=1

(2.15)

Thus, the Baum-Eagon inequality can be used as an iterative maximizing function in
the probability domains. In fact, the nonlinear operator M describes a discrete dynamical
system. The results of experiments on various hyper-graph clustering problems (such as
line clustering, plane clustering, model-point 3D point-pattern matching and illumination
invariant face clustering) confirmed the superiority of this approach.

2.4.2

Clustering Game in Presence of Multiple Similarity Matrices
Similarity-based data clustering algorithms typically work with a single similarity

matrix between objects in a data set. However, in many practical applications, several
similarity relations might be encountered. For instance, in the image segmentation problem,
the similarity between any pair of pixels can be measured using different criteria such as
color, texture and proximity. Thus, several similarity relations might be presented and the
problem becomes to properly select or combine them.
A typical approach to solve these problems is to cluster each similarity matrix individually and aggregate the solutions into final results. The problem of combining multiple
clustering results into a single partition has received considerable attention in the pattern
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recognition communities, as ensemble clustering [67]. Contrary to the ensemble clustering
approaches, where the results of different similarity matrices are combined, the authors in
[68] focused on the problem of properly combining the similarity matrices themselves. From
the graph point of view, this approach is equivalent to clustering weighted multi-graphs, i.e.
the graphs that have multiple edges between pairs of vertices. From a game theoretic point
of view, this problem is in the context of multi-payoff games (multi-criteria games) [69, 70].
The idea is similar to the classical clustering game by extending the dominant sets to evolutionary stable strategies of a multi-payoff clustering game. In fact, the problem of finding
dominant sets in the presence of multiple similarity relations is casted into the problem of
finding Pareto Nash equilibriums [71] (more precisely Biased-ESS [72]) of the corresponding
multi-payoff game.
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CHAPTER 3 : FROM ESS TO EQUILIBRIA1

The main challenge in the clustering game is that the similarity values between every
pair of vertices are needed. The theorem proved in [73] establishes the above property: if x
is an ESS of a game with symmetric payoff matrix A, then aij > 0 for all i, j ∈ σ(x). Based
on this theorem, if the similarity between two vertices is zero, then they can not be in a
dominant set together. This fact is also very intuitive for maximal cliques. If there is not
an edge between two vertices in an unweighted graph, then those two vertices can not be
in a clique. This issue makes the dominant set framework impractical with respect to space
complexity for clustering large data sets. To overcome this problem, two approaches can be
intuitively adopted, including sampling and shrinking. In [74], an out of sample extension
method was developed where a small random portion of the vertices are sampled, and then
the remaining vertices are assigned to the dominant sets obtained in the sampled subset.
However, the method strongly depends on the way the graph is sampled, and the obtained
dominant sets might not be well distributed, i.e. they might not represent all clusters in
the graph. In this regard, Liu et al in [18] proposed a shrinking and expansion algorithm to
construct clusters of a graph from the clusters of its subgraphs. However, in this method,
1

Portions of this chapter were reprinted from International Conference on Data Mining Workshop, A.
Chakeri, L. O. Hall, Large Data Clustering using Quadratic Programming: A Comprehensive Quantitative
Analysis, Copyright (2015), with permission from IEEE
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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the entire similarity matrix is still needed. Moreover, the method is particularly good when
the graph is sparse and contains many small clusters, where the expansion step does not
occur often.
Using the idea of finding clusters of a subset of a dataset and extending them to the
entire dataset, we propose the question of “How can a cluster of a subgraph be a cluster of the
entire graph?”. We will show that the answer to this question is, in some cases, quite challenging. This observation leads us to modify the definition of cluster from a stable concept
(ESS) to a non-stable but optimal one (Nash equilibrium) that makes it computationally
practical to find clusters in graphs with large numbers of vertices. We show that determing
whether a dominant set of a subgraph is a dominant set of entire graph is a coNP-hard
problem. This is in fact a direct results from algorithmic game theory. In [75], it was proved
that to determine whether a given mixed strategy is an ESS is a coNP-hard problem. On
the other hand, we can determine in linear time whether an equilibrium of a subgraph is the
equilibrium of the entire graph.
As a result, defining a cluster as an ESS is not suitable for dealing with large graphs,
hence one might accept being a Nash equilibrium would be more effective to deal with the
space complexity issue. Although a Nash equilibrium is not a stable solution, it abstracts the
main characteristics of a cluster, namely internal coherency and external in-coherency. All
strategies in the support of a Nash equilibrium gains the highest payoff facing itself (internal
coherency), and all strategies outside of its support gains payoff less than or equal to the
equilibrium payoff (external in-coherency).
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3.1

How Can a Cluster of a Subgraph Be a Cluster of the Entire Graph?
Here, we review the theorem proved in [76] to provide an example where an ESS of a

subgraph can not be an ESS of the entire graph but can be a Nash equilibrium.
Let’s denote GB as the subgraph of G induced by the set of vertices in B ⊆ V , with
similarity matrix AB . Also, if x is a mixed strategy for subgraph GB , we define x̂ as the
extension of x to G by adding zero elements to x for vertices that do not belong in GB .
In addition, if x is a mixed strategy of the whole graph G, then x̄ represents the reduction
of x for GB by removing the elements from x for vertices that do not belong to GB . Now,
suppose x is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a clustering game with n×n payoff matrix
A. Let’s define J(x) = {j|uA (ej , x) = max1≤l≤n uA (el , x)} to be the extended-support of x.
Clearly, the extended-support of x contains its support, i.e. σ(x) ⊆ J(x). Let k = |J(x)|
and B be the k × k submatrix of A consisting of the rows and columns corresponding to
elements in J(x), and let C be the (k − 1) × (k − 1) matrix defined by

cij = bij + bkk − bik − bkj

(3.1)

Now, if k = |σ(x)| or k = |σ(x)| + 1, then negative definiteness of C is a necessary and
sufficient condition for x to be an ESS but if k ≥ |σ(x)| + 2 then the negative definiteness of
C is only a sufficient condition for x to be an ESS [76].
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3.1.1

Graph Example
Consider the edge-weighted graph G in Fig 3.1.a, and its subgraph GB in Fig 3.1.b.

Using replicator dynamics, the only ESS of GB is x = (0.2368, 0.3947, 0.3684, 0, 0)T with
only vertices 1, 2 and 3 participating. x̂ = (0.2368, 0.3947, 0.3684, 0, 0, 0)T is also a Nash
equilibrium of the whole graph since the vertices in the support of x̂ obtain the highest
payoff among the other vertices

(Ax̂) = [49.7368, 49.7368, 49.7368, 17.6316, 20.6579, 49.7368]T

(3.2)

Vertex 6 also has the same payoff, so it must be checked
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C = −133.2 −6.6
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−143
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(3.3)

3×3

Since C is not negative definite (its eigenvalues are 147.2342, -90.0200, and -469.8142)
and |J(x)| = |σ(x)| + 1, thus x̂ is not an ESS for the whole graph G. This example shows
that although x constructs an ESS of subgraph GB and x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of the entire
graph, x̂ is not an ESS of the entire graph.

3.1.2

Theoretical Support
In the following, we propose a lemma to develop our Corollary.
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Figure 3.1: A cluster of a subgraph might not be a cluster of the entire graph. (a) Graph G.
(b) Subgraph GB
Lemma 3.1.1. If x is an ESS, then uA (y, y) < uA (x, y) for all y 6= x such that σ(y) ⊆ σ(x).

Proof. Since x is an ESS, then it is a Nash equilibrium and so uA (x, x) = uA (y, x) for all
y 6= x where σ(y) ⊆ σ(x). Hence, since x is an ESS then uA (y, y) < uA (x, y).



According to Lemma 3.1.1, every mixed strategy y whose support is a subset of
support of ESS x, can not be even a Nash equilibrium. In other words, if x is a cluster
for a subgraph, then any subset of vertices in x can not be a cluster for that subgraph,
and consequently for the whole graph. Now, based on the above lemma, we establish the
following corollary to determine whether an ESS of a subgraph GB with similarity matrix
AB is an ESS of the whole graph G with similarity matrix A.
Corollary 3.1.2. Let x be an ESS of GB and S1 = {i|uA (ei , x̂) ≥ uAB (x, x), i ∈ V \ B} and
S2 = {i|uA (ei , x̂) > uAB (x, x), i ∈ V \ B}. Then, x̂ is an ESS of G if S1 is empty. And if S2
is not empty, then x̂ is not an ESS of G. In addition, assume that S2 is empty and |S1 | =
6 0.
If |S1 | = 1, then x̂ is an ESS of G if and only if C is negative definite. For |S1 | ≥ 2, if C is
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negative definite then x̂ is an ESS of G, otherwise it is coNP-hard to determine whether x̂
is an ESS of G or not.

Proof. If S1 is empty, then uG (x̂, x̂) > uG (y, x̂) for every mixed strategy y such that σ(y) 6⊂
σ(x̂). In addition, for every mixed strategy y 6= x̂ such that σ(y) ⊆ σ(x̂), although uG (x̂, x̂) =
uG (y, x̂), but according to Lemma 3.1.1, uGB (ȳ, ȳ) < uGB (x, ȳ), and consequently uG (y, y) <
uG (x̂, y). Hence x̂ is an ESS of G. Now assume that S2 is not empty, it means that there
exists i ∈ S2 such that uG (ei , x̂) > uGB (x, x) = uG (x̂, x̂). So, x̂ is not a Nash equilibrium,
and consequently an ESS. The rest is a direct consequence of section 3.1.



On the other hand, if x is a Nash equilibrium of the subgraph GB , it is straightforward
to judge whether x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of G. If all other vertices outside GB playing against
x̂ earn payoffs not larger than equilibrium payoff uAB (x, x), then x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of
the entire graph G. Or equivalently, if there is a vertex i such that it earns a higher payoff
playing against x̂ than equilibrium payoff uAB (x, x), x̂ is no longer a Nash equilibrium of the
whole graph G.
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CHAPTER 4 : EFFICIENT CLUSTERS ENUMERATION1

After finding the first cluster using a dynamic, such as replicator dynamics, the question is how to find the rest since evolutionary dynamics will find one equilibrium depending
on the initial state. Hence, an equilibrium enumeration method is needed. A simple approach is to use a peeling-off strategy [9], where an equilibrium is detected, and then all of
its vertices are removed from the graph. Repeating this procedure in the remaining data, we
obtain a partitioning of the data where each equilibrium corresponds to a cluster. However,
since the graph is changing during every step of this method, the resultant equilibriums may
not be the equilibriums of the original graph. To overcome the problem, in [77] and [78],
two methods were introduced to enumerate the equilibriums of any symmetric game. In
[77], after extraction of ESS, the graph is changed in such a way that the located ESS becomes unstable under the dynamics without affecting the remaining ESSs. In [78], a tabu-set
method was developed using InImDyn in order to heuristically search the solution space.
On the other hand, dominant sets tend to be a compact set of vertices. This is
because any subset of vertices of a dominant set cannot be a dominant set itself [17]. In
other words, any subset of non zero elements of an ESS can not be even a Nash equilibrium
1

Portions of this chapter were reprinted from IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Data
Mining, L. O. Hall, A. Chakeri, Relational data partitioning using evolutionary game theory, Copyright
(2014), with permission from IEEE
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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(and consequently be an ESS). This property may cause a (big) cluster to be subdivided into
several dominant sets. Hence, we propose an approach to efficiently search the solution space
in order to find the desired number of dominant sets that are positioned among different
bigger clusters. In this regard, the vector containing the payoffs of every vertex playing
against the equilibrium is partitioned into two subsets and the partition that does not contain
the equilibrium vertices is used for detecting the other dominant sets. Also, when the number
of clusters is not provided, we propose an efficient approach to extract the appropriate
number of clusters using Dunn’s index and then partition the objects based on the clusters
obtained using game theory relations. Although the clusters in each partition are clusters
of their equivalent sub graph, they may not be clusters of the entire graph. Hence they are
checked for being a cluster of the entire graph and if they are not, they extended to be a
cluster of the entire graph using InImDyn.

4.1

Equilibrium Enumeration
In clustering problems, two possible cases happen regarding the number of clusters in

a data set. The first is when the number of clusters is known in advance (we call it "known
number of clusters"). The second situation is when we need to determine the appropriate
number of clusters (we call it "unknown number of clusters situation"). In this chapter, we
tackle both situations.
To lay the theoretical groundwork for our algorithm, we further analyze the properties
of the Nash equilibriums and InImDyn. Let’s denote GB as the subgraph of G induced by
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the set of vertices in B and x̂ as the expansion of mixed strategy x of a subgraph GB to G
by adding zero entries to x for vertices that do not belong in GB . If x is a Nash equilibrium
of the subgraph GB , it is easy to judge whether x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of G [18]. In
this regard, if all other vertices outside GB playing against x̂ earn payoffs not larger than
equilibrium payoff uAB (x, x), then x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of the entire graph G. Hence,
if there is a vertex i such that it earns a higher payoff playing against x̂ than equilibrium
payoff uAB (x, x), x̂ is no longer a Nash equilibrium of the whole graph G. We use the above
analysis to develop our proposed algorithm. Specifically, after finding each equilibrium of a
subgraph, the algorithm checks whether the obtained equilibrium is an equilibrium of the
whole graph. If it is not, the obtained equilibria of the subgraph is used as the initial point
for the InImDyn to run on the whole graph. Now, the important feature of InImDyn that
makes it appropriate for our approach is that there is a one to one correspondence between
all of its fixed points and Nash equilibriums. In other words, in spite of replicator dynamics
where the trajectory needs to be started in the interior of the simplex to converge to a Nash
equilibrium, the InImDyn provides convergence to a Nash equilibria starting from any point
in the simplex.

4.1.1

Known Number of Clusters
For the situation in which the number of clusters c is provided, using the notion of

dominant sets is limited to a data set that has a number of equilibriums greater than or equal
the provided number of clusters. However, this limitation is generally satisfied for most data
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sets (This is because of the fact that recently in [79], it was proved that in random two player
games in which each player has the same number of strategies |S|, the mean number of Nash
)]) where B ≈ 0.281644). Hence, a naive approach is
equilibriums is exp(|S| [B + O( log|S|
|S|
to enumerate dominant sets and consider the first c dominant sets created. Particularly,
after finding each dominant set, the peeling-off strategy is employed with the difference that
if the obtained equilibrium of the subgraph is not the equilibrium of the whole graph, it
is used as the initial point for the InImDyn to run on the whole graph [78]. But, as we
show in the experimental section, the obtained dominant sets might not be well distributed
and they may belong to the same clusters. Hence, we propose an approach to extract the
informative dominant sets and then efficiently assign the remaining objects to them. Here,
the informative dominant sets mean highly distributed ones, i.e. their supports are mutually
disjoint sets if possible.
In order to find desired number of well distributed equilibriums, we developed a
method to search the solution space appropriately. In this regard, after finding each equilibrium, the vector containing payoffs for each vertex playing against the equilibrium strategy
is computed and then it is discretized in order to remove the vertices close to the equilibrium
vertices. In fact, we are doing this in the hope of removing the vertices in the basin of
attraction of the obtained equilibrium. One can use several discretization criteria that are
used in spectral graph methods [8, 25] such as median cut, jump cut and ratio cut [80]. Here,
we use the jump cut method. For jump cut, we sort the payoff vector entries in decending
order and find the largest difference between two entries in the sequence. The entries before
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these two entries, which have high payoffs, are grouped as close vertices to the vertices in
the equilibrium. It is easy to see that vertices in the equilibrium should be included in this
group since they have the highest payoff value. By doing this, close vertices to the ones
in the cluster as well as the vertices in the cluster will not be considered to find the next
equilibrium.
The proposed approach is summarized in Algorithm 4.1. It takes a graph G = (S, A)
(S is the set of vertices of size n and A is the similarity matrix of size n × n) as input and
returns a set D containing c clusters of G and two sets of vertices that are explained below.
The enumeration algorithm uses InImDyn (function InImDyn in line 6) that is initialized to
the slightly perturbed barycenter of ∆S\T (function Barycenter in line 5). Also, a tabu-set
T is used to explore the solution space more efficiently. After finding each equilibrium, its
support and those comparable vertices obtained by the jump cut method are added to T
(function JumpCut in line 11), and then InImDyn run on the remaining objects, i.e. on the
subgame obtained by strategies S \ T . If the resulting equilibrium is not an equilibrium of
the entire game, it is used as the initial point for InImDyn to run again on the whole graph
G. This procedure repeats until c clusters are enumerated or T becomes equal to S. In
the latter case, one can use a more strict condition for constructing T such as selecting the
vertices whose payoffs are bigger than the average plus the variance of all vertices playing
against the equilibrium. The algorithm also gives us two more sets. Let’s assume that there
are c clusters represented by the set of equilibriums D = {d1 , d2 , ..., dc }, where each di is a
vector of size n (the non-zero elements of each di , denoted by σ(di ), contains the vertices in
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a cluster). The set D partitions the vertices into two subsets Z = {j ∈ S|∃i, j ∈ σ(di )} and
Ẑ = {j ∈ S|∀i, j ∈
/ σ(di )}, that the set of objects that belong to the support of at least one
equilibrium and those that do not belong to any equilibrium, respectively.
Algorithm 4.1: Equilibrium Enumeration
Input : Graph G = (S, A), and c as the number of clusters.
Output: D a set containing at most c Nash equilibriums of G, Z and Ẑ.
Initialize D = ∅, T = ∅ and counter = 1;
while counter ≤ c or T 6= S do
b = Barycenter(GS\T );
x = InImDyn(GS\T , b);
if there exists i ∈ S such that u(ei , x̂) > u(x̂, x̂) then
d = InImDyn(GS , x̂)
else
d = x̂
T = T ∪ JumpCut(d);
Add d to D, and counter+ = 1;
Partition S into Z = {j ∈ S|∃i, j ∈ σ(di )} and Ẑ = {j ∈ S|∀i, j ∈
/ σ(di )} induced by D

Based on Algorithm 4.1, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium provides a cluster
in which its support represents the objects which belong to the cluster. In addition, the
corresponding equilibrium payoff shows the cohesiveness (compactness) of the cluster. Now,
consider the mapping C : S → {1, ..., c} that assigns each object a class label. To partition
the data, we propose the following relation to assign object i to the appropriate partition

C(i) =






arg maxj

u(ei ,dj )
u(dj ,dj )





arg maxj (dj )i

if i ∈ Ẑ
(4.1)
if i ∈ Z

where (dj )i shows the ith element of dj (the cardinality of dj is n) and C(i) represents the
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partition assigned to object i. The intuition behind this relation is that every object i in
Ẑ is assigned to the partition in which it gains higher relative similarity with regard to the
cluster cohesiveness. In other words, although it is necessary to gain high payoff playing
against the equilibrium strategy, there is also a dependency on the equilibrium payoff. Also,
every object i in Z belongs to the partition that has highest degree of participation. The
partitioning approach is summarized in Algorithm 4.2.
Algorithm 4.2: Dominant Sets Partitioning
Input : Graph G = (S, A) with n vertices, the set of clusters D = {d1 , ..., dc }, Z and
Ẑ.
Output: The vector C representing the partition number of each object.
Initialize the vector C of size n ;
for i ∈ {1, ..., n} do
if i ∈ Z then
C(i) = arg maxj (dj )i ;
else
C(i) = arg maxj

4.1.2

u(ei ,dj )
;
u(dj ,dj )

Unknown Number of Clusters
There are several approaches to determine the appropriate number of clusters in a

data set [81]. Here, Dunn’s index is used to identify sets of clusters that are compact,
with a small variance between members of the clusters, and well separated as compared to
the within cluster variance. A higher Dunn’s index indicates better clustering for a given
assignment of clusters. Specifically, let ∆j be the diameter of the jth cluster, i.e. it is the
largest distance between two distinct points in the cluster. Also, let δj,k be the distance
between the closest points of jth and kth clusters. Then, Dunn’s index is defined as
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Dunn’s index =

minj,k δj,k
maxj ∆j

(4.2)

Now using Dunn’s index, we developed a hierarchical clustering method that employs
algorithms similar to Algorithm 4.1 and 4.2 to enumerate the equilibriums of the graph.
First, Dunn’s index is used to determine the appropriate number of clusters in the first level
of the hierarchy using Algorithm 4.1, and data is partitioned using Algorithm 4.2. Then,
each partition is considered as an independent data set and the same routine is applied, with
the difference that clusters in each partition are extended to be clusters of G (if they are
not already a clusters of G). This hierarchical equilibrium enumeration continues until the
desired level of hierarchies is reached.
The following summarizes the proposed approach in four steps. To simplify, we
assume that the minimum (min) and maximum (max) number of clusters to use Dunn’s
index is the same for all levels. The min and max values are defined apriori by the user.

1. Apply the Algorithm 4.1 for each number of clusters between min and max.
2. Find the best number of clusters using Dunn’s index.
3. Apply Algorithm 4.2 to partition the data.
4. For each partition in step 3, repeat the procedure until the desired level of hierarchies
is reached, otherwise terminate.
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This algorithm has several properties; 1) the first property which is congruent with our
experimental results is that since the equilibriums obtained by InImDyn are asymptotically
stable points, the clusters obtained in a level will be obtained in the following levels with very
high probability, 2) the clusters in each partition are most probably obtained in decreasing
order of size, and 3) for the first few levels of hierarchies, equilibriums obtained in each
subgraph are the equilibriums of the entire graph with very high probability, hence there is
no need to extend them to an equilibrium of the whole graph.

4.2

Experimental Results
In order to test the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we present a number of

examples that illustrate its various facets in both numerical and relational data sets.

4.2.1

Three Gaussian Clouds
This example contains 600 object vectors X ⊂ <2 . The data were drawn from

three Gaussian distributions containing 450, 100 and 50 examples. Figure 4.1.a depicts
the similarity matrix as an image. Each pixel of the image displays scaled similarity value
of two objects between [0, 255]. White pixels represent high similarity, where black pixels
represent low similarity. The cluster tendency is shown by the number of white blocks along
the diagonal of the image. Hence, the image shows that there are three separable clusters
represented by high similarities around the main diagonal. Figure 4.1.b shows the situation
where the first three equilibriums are considered as the clusters. It can be easily seen that
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.1: Efficient search space for three Gaussian clouds. (a) The similarity matrix of
three Gaussian clouds data set, sorted by the class, represented by an image where each pixel
shows the scaled similarity value between two objects; (b) Three dominant sets, represented
by red ’×’, blue ’o’ and green ’+’, were extracted naively; (c) Three dominant sets were
extracted based on Algorithm 1; (d) Partitioning data points into the obtained dominant
sets in (c) using Algorithm 2.
they are not distributed and they all belong to the same cluster. The result of Algorithm 4.1
is shown in Fig 4.1.c. In this case, the obtained three equilibriums are well dispersed among
the whole data, and each of them represents a true visualized cluster. As one can see there
are some data points which do not belong to any clusters. Hence, Fig 4.1.d shows the result
of applying the Algorithm 4.2 to completely partition the data.
The vectors containing the payoffs of every vertex playing against the three equilibriums are sorted and plotted in Figure 4.2.a-c. In all three figures, vertices in the equilibriums
have the maximum payoffs, and as a cluster gets smaller the corresponding maximum value
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 4.2: Payoffs against the equilibrium strategies. (a) Sorted payoffs against the equilibrium belonging to the largest cluster (450 examples); (b) Sorted payoffs against the equilibrium belonging to the second largest cluster (100 examples); (c) Sorted payoffs against the
equilibrium belonging to the smallest cluster (50 examples).
gets smaller. Moreover, there exists a significant difference in payoffs of some of the vertices
comparing to the maximum payoff, that makes the jump cut an appropriate method for
discretization purposes.

4.2.2

Bioinformatics Data
This example is the real world GPD194 [82, 83] relational data set. This data set is

not numerical. Rather, dissimilarity relation values were obtained by a fuzzy measure applied
to annotations of 194 human gene products which appear in the Gene Ontology. The data
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consists of 21, 87 and 86 gene products from Myotubularin, Receptor Precursor and Collagen
Alpha Chain protein families, respectively. The dissimilarity matrix D is converted to the
similarity matrix A as follows
aij = 1 −

dij
max (D)

(4.3)

The three protein families are visible in Figure 4.3.a; they have been sorted so that
the upper left block is Myotubularin, the middle block is Receptor Precursor, and the lower
right block is Collagen Alpha Chain. The hierarchical partitioning approach is applied on
this data set. The highest Dunn’s index value in level 1 gives 2 clusters which are shown
in Fig 4.3.b. The partitions induced by the obtained two clusters are shown in Fig 4.3.c
where the data points are sorted according to the cluster that they belong to. The results
of the second level of hierarchy are shown in Figs 4.3.d and 4.3.e. Using Dunn’s index, each
partition contains two clusters which are shown in Fig 4.3.d. The clusters were obtained in
the decreasing order of size in each partition. In Fig 4.3.e, for each partition, data points
are sorted by the decreasing order of size of the clusters to which they belong. We can see
that the obtained clusters are well distributed and represent the whole structure of the data.
Also, the clusters in first level are the clusters of the second level as we discussed before.
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(a)

(b)

(d)

(c)

(e)

Figure 4.3: Hierarchical clustering method applied on GPD194 data set. (a) The image of
the similarity matrix sorted by the class where light color is higher similarity and dark color
is lower similarity; (b) Two clusters obtained in the first level represented by red solid lines;
(c) Two partitions obtained from the first level represented by red dashed lines; (d) Four
clusters obtained from the second level represented by red solid lines; (e) Partitioning the
data using the four clusters obtained, where data points are sorted by decreasing size of the
clusters in the level to which they belong.
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CHAPTER 5 : SCALABLE CLUSTERING GAME1

In this chapter, we propose a scalable clustering game model to apply the original
clustering game to large datasets where space complexity matters. Before presenting our
model, we review a recursive way to compute Nash equilibriums efficiently in games with a
special structure. Later on in this chapter, we take the advantage of this technique to solve
the space complexity problem of the clustering game method.

5.1

Reduction of Matrix Game to Compute Nash Equilibrium
Although, every finite game has at least a Nash equilibrium [84, 85], an algorithm

to find Nash equilibriums is necessary. Even in two player games, it is unknown whether a
polynomial time algorithm exists to compute a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, the following
problems are NP-complete problems, even for symmetric games: Given a two-player game,
does it have:

1. a Nash equilibrium where the size of its support is greater than a given number?
2. a Nash equilibrium where its support contains a given strategy?
1

Portions of this chapter were reprinted from International Conference on Pattern Recognition, A. Chakeri, L. O. Hall, Dominant Sets as a Framework for Cluster Ensembles: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach, Copyright (2014), and International Conference on Data Mining Workshop (ICDMW), A. Chakeri,
L. O. Hall, Large Data Clustering using Quadratic Programming: A Comprehensive Quantitative Analysis,
Copyright (2015), with permission from IEEE.
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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3. a Nash equilibrium where its support does not contain a given strategy?

and so on. As a result, reducing the number of strategies in a game (size of a game)
can save significant time in computing Nash equilibriums. In this regard, there are some
efficient approaches to compute equilibria in games with special structures [86, 87, 88, 89].
In this chapter, we use the recursive approach in [89] that decomposes a Nash equilibrium
computation problem into several smaller problems, such that the solution of the original
game can easily be computed from solutions of smaller games: consider an original two player
game O in Table 5.1 where the row and column players play a certain strategy from strategy
sets Sr = {sr1 , . . . , srl } and Sc = {sc1 , . . . , scj }, respectively. Each cell includes two payoffs;
the first for the row player and the second for the column player (e.g. strategy profile (s1 , v1 )
gives the payoffs a1 and d11 to the row and column player, respectively). Also, G and H are
two subcomponents of the original game O. Now according to [89], assume that Sr and Sc
can be labeled as ui , si and v j , tj respectively, in such a way that against any fixed vj , all of
the si give the row player the same payoff, and against any fixed ui , all of the tj give the
column player the same payoff. For example, if the column player plays strategy v1 , then all
of the strategies si give the row player the same payoff, i.e. a1 , and if the row player plays
strategy u1 , then all of the strategies tj give the column player the same payoff, i.e. b1 .
According to [89] the mixed strategy Nash equilibriums of the original game O can
be computed recursively. let’s consider the mixed strategy Nash equilibriums of game G,
G
where pG
si and ptj are the row and column player’s probabilities in that Nash equilibrium,

respectively. Also let πsG and πtG be the corresponding expected payoffs for row and column
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Table 5.1: Original game O with special structure

Row Player’s Strategies

v1

v2

u1
u2
..
.

H

uk
s1
s2
..
.

a1 , d11
a1 , d21
..
.

a2 , d12
a2 , d22
..
.

sm

a1 , dm1

a2 , dm2

Column Player’s Strategies
...
vl
t1
t2
c11 , b1 c12 , b1
c21 , b2 c22 , b2
..
..
.
.
ck1 , bk
...
...
...
...

ck2 , bk

al , d1l
al , d2l
..
.

...
...
...
..
.

tn
c1n , b1
c2n , b2
..
.

...

ckn , bk

G

al , dml

Table 5.2: Reduced game R of original game O in Table 5.1
Column Player’s Strategies

Row Player’s Strategies

v1

v2

...

vl

t

u1

Pn

pG
tj c1j , b1

u2

Pn

pG
tj c2j , b2

j=1
j=1

H

..
.

..
.
Pn

uk
s

j=1

a1 ,

Pm

i=1

pG
si di1

a2 ,

Pm

i=1

pG
si di2

...

al ,

Pm

i=1

pG
si dil

pG
tj ckj , bk

πsG , πtG

players in game G, respectively. Then, the reduced game R from the original game O is
R
R
R
defined as in Table 5.2. Now, if pR
ui , ps and pvi , pt are the equilibrium probabilities for row

and column players in game R, then the Nash equilibrium for the original game O can be
R
O
R G
O
R
O
R G
computed efficiently by setting pO
ui = pui , psi = ps psi , pvj = pvj and ptj = pt ptj . Also, finding

G of the original game O can be done in polynomial time [89].
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5.2

Dominant Sets as a Framework For Cluster Ensembles
Using the above game reduction technique, we propose an efficient approach to solve

the space complexity problem associated with the original clustering game. We partition the
graph into disjoint subgraphs (Division Phase) and the clusters of each subgraph (subclusters) are enumerated. Then, each subcluster is approximated by a set of similar vertices that
has the size of nonzero elements in the subcluster. Following this approximation, we create
a new clustering game on the resultant subclusters, and its clusters are considered as the
clusters of the original clustering game (Aggregation Phase). In other words, from a game
theoretic perspective, the equilibria of the game where its strategies are the entire dataset,
are approximated by the equilibria of the game where its strategies are the equilibria of its
subgames. Finally, data points are assigned to the final equilibria using the relation (4.1).
Before presenting the proposed division and aggregation method, we develop the theoretical foundation needed for the rest of the chapter. First, maximal cliques and dominant
sets are generalized to a special type of vertex-weighted graphs where each weight represents
the number of repetition of the corresponding vertex in the graph. We call this type of graphs
as vertex-repeated graphs. Then, to decrease the complexity, we establish some theorems to
find clusters in vertex-repeated graphs very efficiently.

5.3

Maximal Cliques in Vertex-Repeated Graphs
Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ), where V = {v1 , . . . , vn } is the set

of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is the edge set, and RV = {r1 , . . . , rn } is the set of integer weights
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Figure 5.1: The vertex-repeated graph G (left) and its expanded graph E(G) (right).
of the vertices. We define the expanded graph of G denoted by E(G) in which the weighted
vertices are repeated by the same number of times as their corresponding weights such that
they are fully connected to each other.
Definition 5.3.1. Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ). The expanded graph
of G denoted by E (G) = (VE(G) , EE(G) ) is defined as VE(G) =



vij |i ∈ [n], j ∈ [ri ] , and

EE(G) ⊆ VE(G) × VE(G) such that





(vij , vik ) ∈ EE(G)

∀ i ∈ [n], j 6= k ∈ [ri ]





(vij , vmn ) ∈ EE(G)

if (vi , vm ) ∈ E

(5.1)

Figure 5.1 shows a simple vertex-repeated graph and its expanded version. The set
of vertices and their weights for G are V = {v1 , v2 , v3 , v4 } and RV = {r1 = 1, r2 = 4, r3 =
1, r4 = 2}. The set of vertices for E(G) is VE(G) = {vij |i ∈ [4], j ∈ [ri ]}. As we can see,
the high level structure of E(G) is similar to the structure of G. Additionally, if one of the
repetition of a vertex participates in a maximal clique then all of its repetition also belongs
to that maximal clique, as in the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.3.1. Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ) and suppose C is a maximal
clique in E(G). If vij ∈ C , then vik ∈ C, ∀k 6= j ∈ [ri ].

Proof. Let C be a maximal clique in graph E(G). According to definition 5.3.1, if (v ij , vmn ) ∈
EE(G) then (v ik , vmn ) ∈ EE(G) , ∀k 6= j ∈ [ri ]. Consequently, vik is connected to vij as well
as every vertex that vij is connected to. Also according to definition 5.3.1, (v ij , vik ) ∈ EEG .
Hence, vik has to be included in C.



Now, we are interested in finding the maximal cliques of E(G). Although, one can
find the ESSs of a game with payoff matrix AE(G) +αI in order to find the maximal cliques of
E(G), the size of its adjacency matrix can be very large depending on the sum of the weights
of vertices (i.e. the size of AE(G) is w × w, where w =

Pn

i=1 ri ).

As a result, we developed an

exact method that significantly decreases the space and time complexity to the order of the
number of vertices, n, rather than w. To do this, we define the reduced adjacency matrix of
a vertex-repeated graph G as follows.
Definition 5.3.2. The reduced adjacency matrix, AαR = (aij ) for α ∈ (0, 1), of a vertexrepeated graph G = (V, E, RV ) is defined such that



 (ri −1)+α



ri




aij = 1









0

if i = j
if i 6= j and (v i , vj ) ∈ E
if i 6= j and (v i , vj ) ∈
/E
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(5.2)

For instance, Table 5.3 shows the adjacency matrix and reduced adjacency matrix
(α = 0.2) of the expanded graph in Fig 5.1. Even for this small example, the size of the
reduced adjacency matrix is half of the size of its adjacency matrix.
Table 5.3: Adjacency and reduced adjacency matrices of the graph in Figure 5.1
0.2
AR

AE(G)

0

1


1

1

1


1

1

1

1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1



1

0


0

0

0


1

1

0


0.2

1

1

1

1
3.2
4

0
0

1
0
0.2
1

1
0
1
1.2
2







4×4

8×8

Using the notion of reduced adjacency matrix, we also define the reduced characteristic
vector of a maximal clique in E(G) as follows.
Definition 5.3.3. Suppose C is a maximal clique in E(G). Define the reduced characteristic
vector xC
R of C as
(xC
R )i

=





ri

 |C|

if vij ∈ C





0

otherwise

(5.3)

Now, we establish the theorem that relates the maximal cliques of an expanded graph
to the ESSs of the game with the reduced adjacency matrix as its payoff.
Theorem 5.3.2. Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ) and its reduced adjacency
matrix AαR . Then the ESSs of a game with the payoff matrix AαR are in the form of the reduced
characteristic vectors of the maximal cliques of E(G).
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Proof. Since (v ij , vik ) ∈ EE(G) for all k 6= j ∈ [ri ], the symmetric matrix A = AE(G) + αI can
be written as a block matrix as follows
"

#
H U
A=
L G

(5.4)

such that G is a symmetric square matrix of size ri × ri of the following form


α 1 ... 1


1 α . . . 1


G = . . . .
 .. .. .. .. 


1 1 1 α

(5.5)

ri ×ri

The ESS and expected payoff of the subgame G are the vector [ r1i , r1i , . . . , r1i ] of size
ri and

(ri −1)+α
,
ri

respectively. Also, because if (vij , vmn ) ∈ EE(G) then (vik , vmn ) ∈ EE(G) for

all k 6= j ∈ [ri ], the rows of matrix L are equal, i.e.


a1 a2 . . . a m


a1 a2 . . . am 


L=. .

.
.
..
.. 
 .. ..


a1 a2 · · · am

(5.6)

ri ×m

where m = w − ri . Similarly the columns of matrix U are also equal, i.e.




a
a1 . . . a 1
 1

 a2 a2 . . . a 2 


U = .
..
..
.. 
 ..
.
.
. 


am am · · · am
m×ri
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(5.7)

Now, we can use the approach described in subsection section 5.1 to find the ESSs
efficiently: the ESSs of the original game can be obtained by the ESSs of the reduced game
having a payoff matrix with the following form
"

0

H U
AR =
0
0
L G
0

#
(5.8)

0

such that L = [a1 , a2 , . . . , am ] and U = [a1 , a2 , . . . , am ]T are row and column vectors, and
0

G =

(ri −1)+α
.
ri

Keep doing the same reduction of AR for all i, the final payoff matrix would

reduced to AαR . Thus, the ESSs of the original game A can be found by the ESSs of the
reduced game AαR and vice versa. Besides that we know the ESSs of the original game are
in the form of a characteristic vector of maximal cliques of E(G). Hence, the ESSs of the
reduced game with payoff matrix AαR are in the form of a reduced characteristic vector of
maximal cliques of E(G).



Following Theorem 5.3.2, instead of finding maximal cliques of an expanded graph
with the adjacency matrix of size w × w, we can find ESSs of a game with the payoff matrix
as the reduced adjacency matrix of size n × n. Then, we can simply extract the vertices of
the maximal cliques using the nonzero elements of the characteristic vectors.

5.3.1

How to Find Maximal Cliques in E(G)
According to what we discussed in Chapter 2, a possible way to find maximal cliques

is by using replicator dynamics. However, we need to address the convergence behavior of
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replicator dynamics for the reduced adjacency matrix. In fact, the reduced adjacency matrix
induces a special space over the simplex as in below.
Definition 5.3.4. Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ). Let w1 = 0 and
wi =

Pj=i−1
j=1

V
⊂ ∆w as the set of mixed strategies
rj for i ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1}. Define ∆R
w

x ∈ ∆w such that ∀i ∈ [n]

xj = xk , ∀j 6= k ∈ {wi + 1, . . . , wi+1 }

(5.9)

Definition 5.3.5. Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ). Define for each mixed
strategy x ∈ ∆w , a mixed strategy xR ∈ ∆n such that (xR )i =

Pwi+1

j=wi +1

xj . We call xR the

V
reduction of x. Similarly for each mixed strategy xR ∈ ∆n , define a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆R
w

so that, for all j ∈ [n] and for all i ∈ {wj + 1, . . . , wj+1 }, xi =

(xR )j
.
rj

We call x the expansion

of xR .

V
Now, we show that given a vertex-repeated graph G, ∆R
is invariant under the
w

replicator dynamics for the payoff matrix AE(G) + αI (α ∈ (0, 1)). In other words, if the
V
population state starts from a mixed strategy in ∆R
w , it will always remains in the same

space.
Lemma 5.3.3. Given a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ), if the current population
t+1
V
state, xt , belongs to ∆R
, by the replicator dynamics on
w , then the next population state, x
V
the payoff matrix AE(G) + αI also belongs to ∆R
w .
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Proof. Let P = AE(G) + αI be the payoff matrix. According to the replicator dynamics
formula, it is sufficient to show that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (P x)j = (P x)k ∀j 6= k ∈ {wi +
1, . . . , wi+1 }, since xj = xk . By definition, the jth row of P is the same as its kth row except
Pjj = Pkk = α and Pjk = Pkj = 1, hence we have

(P x)j =

X

Pjr xr =

r

=

X

Pjr xr + Pjj xj + Pjk xk

r6=j,k

X

Pkr xr + Pkk xk + Pkj xj =

X

Pkt xt

(5.10)

t

r6=j,k

= (P x)k


Theorem 5.3.4. Consider the population states xt and xt+1 of a replicator dynamics trajecV
tory which is initialized in ∆R
w over the payoff matrix AE(G) + αI of a vertex-repeated graph

G = (V, E, RV ). If xtR is the reduction of xt , then the next population state of replicator
dynamics over the payoff matrix AαR , i.e. xt+1
, is the reduction of xt+1 .
R
Proof. For simplicity of notation, let P = AE(G) + αI and Q = AαR . First we need to show
that (QxR )i = (P x)m for all m ∈ {wi + 1, . . . , wi+1 }. To prove this we have

(QxR )i =

n
X

Qik (xR )k =

k=1

=

n
X
k=1
k6=i

n
X

Qik (xR )k +

k=1
k6=i
wk+1

Qik (

P i+1
( w
s=wi +1 xs )(ri − 1 + α)
xl ) +
ri
+1

X
l=wk

(ri − 1 + α)
(xR )i
ri
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(5.11)

Now, according to the definition of the reduced graph, we know that Qik = 1 (i 6= k)
if and only if Pml = 1 for all m ∈ {wi + 1, . . . , wi+1 } and l ∈ {wk + 1, . . . , wk+1 }. Hence for
all m ∈ {wi + 1, . . . , wi+1 }
n
X

wk+1

Qik (

k=1
k6=i

X

w
X

xl ) =

Pmp xp

(5.12)

p=1
p6=wi +1,...,wi+1

l=wk +1

V
Also, since x ∈ ∆R
w , we know that (xR )i =

Pwi+1

s=wi +1

xs = ri xm for all m ∈ {wi +1, . . . , wi+1 }.

Hence,

Pwi+1

s=wi +1

wi+1
wi+1
X
X
xs (ri − 1 + α)
Pmp xp
Pmp =
= xm (ri − 1 + α) = xm
ri
p=w +1
p=w +1

(5.13)

i

i

Thus, from (5.11)-(5.13), for all m ∈ {wi + 1, . . . , wi+1 }
wi+1

w
X

(QxR )i =

X

Pmp xp +

p=1
p6=wi +1,...,wi+1

Pmp xp = (P x)m

(5.14)

p=wi +1

Now, using (5.14), we show that xTR QxR = xT P x as follows

T

x Px =

w
X

xi (P x)i =

i=1

=

=

wj+1
n
X
X

xk (P x)k

j=1 k=wj +1

n
X

wj+1

j=1

k=wj +1

(QxR )j

X

xk

n
X
(QxR )j (xR )j = xTR QxR
j=1
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(5.15)

t+1
Using (5.14) and (5.15), we show that xt+1
as follows
R is the reduction of x

wk+1

X

wk+1
X
(P x)i
1
xi (P x)i
xi T
= T
x Px
xR QxR i=w +1
+1

wk+1

xt+1
i

X

=

i=wk +1

i=wk

=

k

(5.16)

(xR )k (QxR )k
= (xR )t+1
k
xTR QxR


This completes the proof.

V
Following Theorem 5.3.4, since every trajectory starting from the interior of ∆R
w

converges to a fixed point which is an equilibrium, the corresponding trajectory obtained by
its reduction also converges to an equilibrium.
Hence, we propose a very efficient method to find a maximal clique of an expanded
graph E(G) as follows.

1. Start replicator dynamics from the weighted barycenter of ∆, i.e. from the vector
( rw1 , . . . , rwn ), over a game with payoff matrix AαR .
2. Iterate along a trajectory until it reaches an equilibrium.
3. Construct the maximal clique from the nonzero elements of the obtained equilibrium.

5.3.2

How the Weights of Vertices Affect the Results
“How does a maximal clique of the expanded graph of a vertex-repeated graph change

if the weights of vertices change?” To answer this question, we define the plain graph of a
vertex-repeated graph as follows.
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Definition 5.3.6. The plain graph of a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ), denoted by
Ĝ = (V, E), is a graph with the same set of vertices and edges as G but with node weights
equal to one.

A vertex-repeated graph and its plain version would have a similar underlying structure, as in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.5. Consider a vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ). Ĉ = {vl , . . . , vc } is a
maximal clique in Ĝ if and only if C = {vl1 , . . . , vlrl , . . . , vc1 , . . . , vcrc } is a maximal clique in
E(G).

Proof. Based on the definition of an expanded graph, vij and vmn are connected to each
other in E(G) if and only if vi and vm are connected in graph Ĝ. Also, (vij , vik ) ∈ E(G) for
all k 6= j ∈ [ri ]. Therefore C = {vl1 , . . . , vlrl , . . . , vc1 . . . , vcrc } is a maximal clique in graph
G if and only if C = {vl , . . . , vc } is a maximal clique in graph Ĝ.



According to lemma 5.3.5, we can construct a maximal clique in E(G) from a maximal
clique in Ĝ. Thus, the question is what is the difference, in terms of speed, between using a
game with payoff matrix AĜ + αI or a game with payoff matrix AαR to find maximal cliques
of E(G) (both matrices have size n×n)? To answer this question, we need to further analyze
the behaviour of replicator dynamics. Specifically, replicator dynamics tends to find maximal
cliques with high cardinality, or in the best case the maximum clique [90]. Hence, using the
payoff matrix AĜ + αI causes convergence to maximal cliques of Ĝ with high cardinalities
that may not be a large maximal clique in E(G). On the other hand, using the payoff matrix
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AαR causes replicator dynamics to converge to maximal cliques with high cardinality in E(G).
In fact, in many applications, we want to find maximal cliques in decreasing order of size;
such as maximum clique finding. As a result, a reduced adjacency matrix is significantly
better for these type of applications [91, 92].
Example 5.3.1. Consider the vertex-repeated graph depicted in Fig 5.1. The ESSs of the
games with payoff matrix AE(G) + αI, A0.2
R and AĜ are shown in Table 5.4, such that:
1. xC1 and xC2 are the characteristic vectors of maximal cliques C1 = {v11 , v21 , v22 , v23 , v24 }
and C2 = {v11 , v31 , v41 , v42 } in E (G). The order is in decreasing size (|C1 | = 5 and
|C2 | = 4).
C2
1
2. xC
R and xR are the reduced characteristic vectors of maximal cliques C1 and C2 (still

with decreasing size).
0

0

3. xC1 and xC2 are the characteristic vectors of the maximal cliques in the reduced graph
Ĝ.

Thus, by using a reduced adjacency matrix, replicator dynamics tends to find maximal
cliques with respect to the actual weights rather than the cardinality. But using the adjacency
matrix AĜ tends to find maximal cliques with respect to the cardinality rather than the actual
weight.
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Table 5.4: ESSs of the expanded, reduced and plain graphs of Figure 5.1
Using Matrix AEG
x

C1

=

C2

=

x

5.4

h

1
h5

1
4

1
5

1
5

0

0

1
5

0

1
5

0

0
1
4

0
1
4

i
0
i

1
4

0.2
Using Matrix AR
h
i
1
1
4
xC
=
0
0
R
h5 5
i
2
1
xC
=
0 14 24
R
4

Using Matrix AĜ
h
i
0
x = 31 0 31 13
i
h
0
xC2 = 12 12 0 0
C1

Clusters in Vertex-Repeated and Edge-Weighted Graphs
In the previous section, we extensively studied the maximal cliques in binary vertex-

repeated graphs. In this section, we generalize the characteristics of clusters in vertexrepeated and edge-weighted graphs. In the expanded version of a vertex-repeated and edgeweighted graph, each weighted vertex is replaced by a dense subgraph. If the subgraph is
really dense, then an outside vertex has the same similarity to all the vertices in the subgraph.
The following definition describes it precisely.
Definition 5.4.1. We represent a vertex-repeated and edge-weighted graph by tuple G =
(V, ΘE , RV , βV ), where V = {v1 , . . . , vn } is the set of vertices, ΘE : V × V → R+ is the
edge’s weight function, RV = {r1 , . . . , rn } is the set of integer weights of vertices, and
βV = {β1 , . . . , βn } is the set of real values assigned to each vertex. Define the expanded

graph E(G) = (VE(G) , ΘE(G) ) such that VE(G) = vij |i ∈ [n], j ∈ [ri ] and






ΘE(G) (vij , vij ) = 0





ΘE(G) (vij , vik ) = βi









ΘE(G) (vij , vmn ) = ΘE (vi , vm )

∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [ri ]
∀ i ∈ [n], j 6= k ∈ [ri ]
∀ i 6= m ∈ [n], j ∈ [ri ], n ∈ [rm ]
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(5.17)

Now, we show that if one repetition of a vertex participates in a cluster, all of its
repetitions also belongs to that cluster.
Lemma 5.4.1. Let G = (V, ΘE , RV , βV ) and x = (x11 , . . . , xnrn ) ∈ ∆w×w be an equilibrium
for E(G). If xij 6= 0, then for all k 6= j ∈ [ri ], xik 6= 0. Additionally, xij = xik .

Proof. We show that (AE(G) x)ij = (AE(G) x)ik for all k 6= j ∈ [ri ]:

(AE(G) x)ij =

[ri ]
X

βi xil + constant

(5.18)

βi xil + constant

(5.19)

l=1
l6=j

(AE(G) x)ik =

[ri ]
X
l=1
l6=k

Subtracting (5.19) from (5.18), we have:

(AE(G) x)ij − (AE(G) x)ik = βi xik − βi xij

(5.20)

Since x is an equilibrium and xij 6= 0, thus (AE(G) x)ij ≥ (AE(G) x)ik . As a result, the
left hand side of (5.20) is greater than zero, so xik ≥ xij > 0. Now, since xik > 0, thus
(AE(G) x)ij − (AE(G) x)ik = 0. This implies that the right hand side of (5.20) is zero, so that
xik = xij .



60

5.4.1

How to Find the Clusters of E(G)
Simply to find the clusters of E(G), we can find the equilibriums of a game with payoff

matrix AE(G) . However, the size of its similarity matrix can be very large depending on the
sum of the weights of vertices (it is w × w). But, AE(G) has some nice structural properties:
intuitively, for each i, the corresponding rows and columns of vij for all j are the same, except
in the entries for their pairwise similarities. In fact, they are similar to each other by βi .
Using this property and the method discussed in section 5.1, we developed an exact method
that significantly decrease the space and time complexity to find equilibrium of E(G). To do
this, we define the reduced similarity matrix of a vertex-repeated and edge-weighted graph
as follows.
Definition 5.4.2. The reduced similarity matrix, AR = (aij ), of a vertex-repeated and
edge-weighted graph G = (V, ΘE , RV , βV ) is defined such that

aij =






ΘE (v i , vj ) i 6= j



β (r −1)

 i rii

(5.21)

i=j

Also, we define a special mapping from any mixed strategy in ∆w to ∆n as below.
Definition 5.4.3. Assume that x = (x11 , . . . , xnrn ) ∈ ∆w×w . Then we define xR as the
reduction of x with size n as follows

(xR )i =

ri
X
j=1
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xij

(5.22)

Based on definitions 5.4.2 and 5.4.3, we establish an important theorem that relates
the equilibriums of an expanded graph to the equilibriums of a game with its reduced similarity matrix as its payoff.
Theorem 5.4.2. Consider a vertex-repeated and edge-weighted graph G = (V, ΘE , RV , βV ).
x is an equilibrium of E(G) if and only if its reduction xR is an equilibrium of the game with
payoff matrix AR .

Proof. Since x is an equilibrium of E(G), according to lemma 5.4.1, for any i ∈ [n], (xR )i =
Pri

j=1

xij = ri xij for any j ∈ [ri ]. Also, we have

(AR xR )i = βi (ri − 1)xij + constant = (AE(G) x)ij

(5.23)

Since if xij 6= 0 then (AE(G) x)ij has the maximum payoff, then for any i that xij 6= 0,
(AR xR )i is the maximum. So, xR is an equilibrium for AR . Similar relations hold for the


only if part.

According to the above theorem, we find the equilibriums of the game with the payoff
matrix AR of size n × n rather than finding the equilibriums of the expanded graph having
a similarity matrix of size w × w. This significantly reduces the time complexity of finding
equilibriums of the expanded graph of a vertex-repeated and edge-weighted graph.
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5.4.2

How the Weights of Vertices Affect the Results
In this subsection, we answer the question “How does a cluster of the expanded graph

of a vertex-repeated and edge-weighted graph change if the weights of its vertices change?”
Particularly, we show that the the weights of vertices enforce a hard constraint on the way
that vertices make up a cluster.
Lemma 5.4.3. Consider a vertex-repeated and edge-weighted graph G = (V, ΘE , RV , βV )
with the reduced similarity matrix AR = (aij ). If xR is an ESS of AR then 2aij > aii + ajj
for all i 6= j ∈ σ(xR ).
Proof. Assume that x ∈ ∆n is a reduced characteristic vector of a dominant set which implies
x is an ESS of the corresponding game with payoff matrix AR = (aij ). Now suppose that
2aij ≤ aii + ajj for i 6= j ∈ σ(x), and let y = δ(ei − ej ) + x, where the 0 < δ ≤ xj . Using
the fact that x is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. ei AR x = ej AR x, it can be seen that y ∈ β{x}. In
other words, y is a best reply to x as follows

y T AR x = (δ(ei − ej ) + x)T AR x = δ(ei − ej )AR x + xT AR x = xT AR x

(5.24)

however we have

(x − y)T AR y = −δ(ei − ej )T AR (δ(ei − ej ) + x) = −δ 2 (ei − ej )T AR (ei − ej )
(5.25)
= −δ 2 (aii + ajj − aij − aji ) = −δ 2 (aii + ajj − 2aij ) ≤ 0

which contradicts the assumption that x is an ESS.
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Based on the above lemma, the values on the diagonal play an important role in
forming the clusters. It shows how the reduced similarity matrix AR causes the results to
be different from the results using the similarity matrix AĜ , where Ĝ is the plain version
of G. As βi increases (i.e. the ith subgraph becomes more dense), it is getting harder for
a different vertex to join the cluster that vertex i belongs to. Similar results, theorems and
proofs can be obtained here for replicator dynamics as in subsection 5.3.1.

5.5

Scalable Clustering Game: A Division and Aggregation Method
Now that the theoretical foundations are established, we are ready to explain our

proposed division and aggregation method for a scalable clustering game:

1. In the division phase, the entire numerical dataset with similarity matrix A is partitioned into k tractable size disjoint chunks with similarity matrices A1 , A2 , . . . , Ak .
Each chunk is clustered into subclusters by a clustering game as in Chapter 4. Assume the ith chunk has qi subclusters where the corresponding equilibria are Ei =
{di1 , di2 , . . . , diqi }. We denote a typical element of Ei as diqi . Each subcluster diqi has
|σ(diqi )| nonzero elements which are denoted by rqi i . Also, w =

Pk Pqi
i=1

i
j=1 rj

be the to-

tal number of nonzero elements in all subclusters, and the total number of subclusters
is denoted by n, i.e. n =

Pk

i=1 qi .

To calculate the similarity between two subclusters diqi and djqj , the similariy matrix
between the data points in the ith and jth chunks are needed. But these similarity
matrices are not stored, we only kept the similarity matrices of each chunk. Hence, we
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consider an approximation as follows: it is reasonable to assume that nonzero elements
of each equilibrium belong to it with the same degree, that is for all j, k ∈ σ(diqi ),
(diqi )j = (diqi )k . Moreover, since the data points in any subcluster diqi are similar to
each other, we assume that they all have the same feature vector which is the average of
feature vectors of the data points in σ(diqi ). Hence, the subcluster diqi is approximated
by a clique having rqi i number of vertices, wherein the similarity values between the
vertices in the clique is a constant real number βqii that is called subcluster compactness.
In order to calculate the subcluster compactness, we impose the payoff obtained by
the approximate clique to be the same as the payoff obtained by the corresponding
subcluster. Hence, we have βqii =

rqi i
i
rqi −1

uAi (diqi , diqi ).

2. Now, in the aggregation phase, the subclusters of all chunks participate in a clustering
game, which we call the scalable clustering game. Each cluster of a scalable clustering
game is a combination of some subclusters. Taking into account this setting, a scalable
clustering game is in fact equivalent to the expanded graph of a vertex-repeated and
edge-weighted graph. Specifically, each subcluster forms repeated vertices that are
connected to each other by the subcluster compactness. Also, since we assumed that
the feature vectors of each vertex in a subcluster are the same, the similarities of
repeated vertices of a subcluster to every other vertex outside the subcluster is the
same. Hence, to find the equilibria of a scalable clustering game, we can use the
efficient method developed in Section 5.4. Formally speaking, we may reduce the size
of the similarity matrix of the scalable clustering game to its reduced version.
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3. Finally, the vertices are assigned to the clusters obtained in the aggregation phase by
the method in Subsection 4.1.1.

5.6

Time and Space Complexity Analysis
One of the significant advantages of this approach is that it provides a parallel frame-

work for clustering graphs with a large number of vertices. That is, each partition of the
graph can be processed by different processors, simultaneously. In this regard, the space
complexity for each approximately equal sized subgraph is reduced quadratically based on
2

the number of partitions k, i.e. it is Ω( |Vk2| ). However, the total space complexity would be
2

Ω( |Vk2| + d2 ) where d is the total number of dominant sets in all subgraphs.
Considering that pairwise similarity calculations take quadratic time in the number
of vertices, and InImDyn takes linear time in the number of vertices to converge to a Nash
equilibrium, the time complexity for finding dominant sets of the entire graph is Ω(|V |2 +
δm|V |) where δ and m are the number of steps and dominant sets obtained, respectively. On
2

the other hand, the time complexity for finding dominant sets in each subgraph is Ω( |Vk2| +
δm |Vk | ). Hence, the total time complexity in the case of a parallel implementation with p
2

CPU’s is Ω( |Vkp| + δ1 m1 |Vp | + d2 + δ2 m2 d).
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5.7
5.7.1

Experimental Results
Maximum Weight Clique
Given an undirected graph with weights on its vertices, the maximum weight clique

problem (MWCP) is to find a maximal clique having the largest total weight. The MWCP
is a well-known problem in combinatorial optimization, not only because it belongs to the
class of NP-complete problems, but also for its theoretical as well as practical applications.
The MWCP has important applications in pattern recognition, computer vision and network
analysis [93, 92, 91, 94]. In the literature, there exist several algorithms to solve MWCP
[95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 1]. The first solution might have been developed in [95] where the problem
was formulated as integer linear programming. Pardalos and Desai in [96] developed a branch
and bound approach by formulating the MWCP as an unconstrained quadratic 0-1 problem.
Balas and Xue in [97] solved MWCP by introducing a fast heuristic algorithm for the weighted
fractional coloring problem and using it as an upper bound procedure in a branch and bound
approach. Also in [98], Babel proposed a fast branch and bound procedure which is one of
the most efficient algorithms for MWCP. In addition, Gibbons et al. [99] generalized the
Motzkin-Straus formulation of the maximum clique problem to the weighted case. However,
one drawback associated with this method is the presence of spurious solutions. Hence,
Bomze et al. in [1] introduced a regularized continuous formulation of the MWCP inspired
by the previous work on the unweighted case. They introduced a particular class of matrices
and proposed an evolutionary game theoretic approach to approximately solve the MWCP
using replicator dynamics. However as the authors mentioned in [1], their approach tends to
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find large cliques with respect to cardinality rather than the size of the actual MWC. In this
section, we use the proposed framework for maximal cliques in vertex-repeated graphs to
solve MWCP with integer weights. The integer weights limit our approach, but practically
the real numbers with some digits of precision can be changed to integer values without
changing the results.
Let’s denote G = (V, E, RV ) as a graph with n vertices such that weight ri of
each vertex vi is an integer number. One can easily see that the maximum weighted clique
problem in G is equivalent to the maximum clique problem in the expanded graph E(G). In
[90], extensive experiments were done showing that replicator dynamics tends to find large
cliques (in best case the maximum clique). In other words, the basin of attraction of the
global solution with regard to the problem (2.2) is quite large. This suggests that one can use
replicator dynamics to approximately obtain the maximum clique of E(G) or equivalently
the maximum weighted clique in G, but clearly the size of the adjacency matrix AE(G) can
be very large depending on the weights. The problem can even be worse knowing that
replicator dynamics is quadratic in each step in terms of the size of the adjacency matrix. In
this regard, by employing the reduced adjacency matrix AαR , the complexity of the MWCP
is significantly decreased. To practically assess the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
we ran the algorithm on small randomly generated graphs, and over a number of DIMACS
[100] graphs. The experiments were done in MATLAB and run on a machine equipped with
2 Intel 2 GHz CPUs and 8 GB RAM.
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5.7.1.1

Experiments on Random Graphs

In this set of experiments, graphs were generated according to the Erdos-Renyi model,
where each edge out of

n
2



is selected with a fixed probability p. Hence the average density

of these graphs is p. We constructed 100 random graphs with 20 vertices and weights
uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 10} for varying densities p = 0.1, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9. Table 5.5
shows the exact maximum weight clique (column labeled ‘MWC‘) and the maximal clique
obtained by our proposed approach averaged over all 100 instances (column labeled ‘RD‘).
Also, the column ‘quality‘ represents the ratio of

RD
MW C

in percent. The exact MWC was

calculated by the method in [101] applied on the expanded graphs which was possible due
to the small order of the graphs involved. From Table 5.5, one can see that the proposed
approach obtains results very close to the exact ones for different densities. As the density p
increases, where more than one global solutions might exist, our method is almost the same
as MWC. This is remarkable since generally dense graphs represent more difficult problem
instances.
Table 5.5: Performance of our approach on the Erdos-Renyi random graph
density

RD

MWC

quality

p = 0.1

17.39

18.81

92.45

p = 0.5

33.65

36.02

93.42

p = 0.75

50.88

52.46

96.99

p = 0.9

72.05

72.49

99.39

Since Erdos-Renyi graphs tend to be very regular graphs, another type of random
graph called Barabasi-Albert has been used for experiments. It emulates a power-law degree
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distribution network (scale-free network). This type of random graph formulation considers
both growth and preferential attachment. Particularly, consider a graph with m0 vertices,
then, in each step, a new vertex is added and links to m ≤ mo vertices (usually m = m0 − 1)
of the m current vertices with probabilities relative to the degree of each vertex. Scale-free
networks are widely observed in natural systems including the Internet, the world wide web
and social networks. In our experiments, similar setups have been done for this type of
random graph. The results for four cases are shown in Table 5.6, where m = m0 − 1. As we
can see, similar to what we observed with Erdos-Renyi graphs, as the graphs become more
dense, our method delivers almost the same results as MWC.
Table 5.6: Performance of our approach on the Barabasi-Albert random graph

5.7.1.2

initialization

RD

MWC

quality

m0 = 2, m = 1

16.19

18.23

88.81

m0 = 5, m = 4

26.60

28.90

92.04

m0 = 12, m = 11

40.28

41.92

96.09

m0 = 17, m = 16

32.59

32.93

99.39

Experiments on DIMACS Graphs

Here, we test our approach over a number of DIMCAS benchmark graphs [100] that
we explicitly developed to test clique finding algorithms. To improve the results, an “annealed
imitation” strategy proposed in [102, 103] was adopted. Particualrly, a standard replicator
dynamics is inherently unable to escape from inefficient local solutions. In this regard, the
authors in [102, 103] developed a principled way of varying a regularization parameter during
the evolution process to avoid inefficient local solutions. They proved that the regularization
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parameter controls the size of strict local solutions of the standard quadratic program (2.2).
Also, they used the theoretical results in [104, 102] to select an approperiate annealing
schedule to change the regularization parameter.
As a result, we improved the way to use the replicator dynamics as in Algorithm
5.1. It takes a vertex-repeated graph G and returns the reduced characteristic vector of a
maximal clique in E(G). The algorithm uses replicator dynamics (function RepDyn) that
is initialized to the barycenter of ∆n (function Barycenter). Also there are some parameters
that we explain here: for a graph with n vertices and edge density p, let’s define M (n, p) =
2 log1/p n − 2 log1/p log1/p n + 2 log1/p 2e + 1 and γm = 1 − (1 − p)m −

p
mp(1 − p)δ ν where δ

is a small value, say 0.01, and ν = 1/2(n − m).
Algorithm 5.1: Maximum Weight Clique Finding
Input : A vertex-repeated graph G = (V, E, RV ) with n vertices and edge density p
Output: x the reduced characteristic vector of a maximal clique of E(G)
m = M (n, p);
α = (γm + γm−1 )/2;
x = Barycenter (∆n );
while m > 1 and α ≤ 0 do
x = RepDyn (AαR , x);
m = m − 1;
α = (γm + γm−1 )/2
x = RepDyn (A0.5
R , x);

For each internal loop in Algorithm 5.1, the replicator dynamics is iterated until the
square distance between two consequitive points becomes smaller than 10−10 . Also, the final
replicator dynamics (line 8) is iterated until either a maximal clique is found or the square
distance between two consequitive states becomes less than n10−10 . For the latter case, we
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Table 5.7: Results of our approach and the method in [1] on DIMACS graphs
name
c-fat500-1
c-fat500-10
c-fat500-2
c-fat500-5
san200_0.7_1
san200_0.7_2
san200_0.9_1
san200_0.9_2
san200_0.9_3
san400_0.5_1
san400_0.7_1
san400_0.7_2
san400_0.7_3
san400_0.9_1
brock200_1
brock200_2
brock200_3
brock200_4
brock400_1
brock400_2
brock400_3
brock400_4
brock800_1
brock800_2
brock800_3
brock800_4
hamming6-2
hamming6-4
hamming8-2
hamming8-4
hamming10-2
p_hat500-1
p_hat500-2
p_hat500-3
p_hat700-1
p_hat700-2
p_hat700-3
p_hat1000-1
p_hat1000-2
p_hat1000-3
sanr200_0.7
sanr200_0.9
sanr400_0.5
sanr400_0.7

graph
order density
500
0.036
500
0.373
500
0.073
500
0.186
200
0.7
200
0.7
200
0.9
200
0.9
200
0.9
400
0.5
400
0.7
400
0.7
400
0.7
400
0.9
200
0.745
200
0.496
200
0.605
200
0.658
400
0.748
400
0.749
400
0.748
400
0.749
800
0.649
800
0.651
800
0.649
800
0.65
64
0.905
64
0.349
256
0.969
256
0.639
1024
0.99
500
0.253
500
0.505
500
0.752
700
0.249
700
0.498
700
0.748
1000
0.245
1000
0.49
1000
0.744
200
0.697
200
0.898
400
0.501
700
0.7
average results

max clique
14
126
26
64
30
18
70
60
44
13
40
30
22
100
21
12
15
17
27
29
31
33
23
24
25
26
32
4
128
16
512
9
36
49
11
44
62
10
46
66
18
42
13
21

sum of weights
reduced EG Bomze improvement
91
71
1.28
694
620
1.11
155
143
1.08
387
360
1.07
135
135
1
118
118
1
351
355
0.98
287
279
1.02
254
235
1.08
69
69
1
188
186
1.01
145
145
1
116
116
1
417
418
0.99
123
117
1.05
67
68
0.98
100
99
1.01
99
93
1.06
175
174
1.00
157
149
1.05
155
146
1.06
155
130
1.19
121
127
1.04
131
120
1.09
133
129
1.03
138
138
1
210
199
1.05
33
30
1.1
520
527
0.98
113
85
1.32
1850
1224
1.51
55
62
0.88
204
198
1.03
299
291
1.02
61
60
1.01
250
242
1.03
395
383
1.03
61
61
1
311
291
1.06
431
413
1.04
113
111
1.01
239
243
0.98
82
75
1.09
141
131
1.07
230.20
212.86
1.08

reduced EG
13
126
26
62
15
12
44
37
31
7
20
15
12
48
15
8
11
13
22
18
19
20
16
16
15
17
32
4
75
16
304
8
26
43
8
36
53
7
40
63
15
34
10
18
32.95

size of clique
Bomze improvement
8
1.625
89
1.41
19
1.36
50
1.24
15
1
12
1
45
0.97
37
1
28
1.10
7
1
20
1
15
1
12
1
50
0.96
14
1.07
7
1.14
11
1
11
1.18
21
1.04
16
1.12
17
1.11
15
1.33
14
1.14
13
1.23
14
1.07
15
1.13
30
1.06
3
1.33
70
1.07
9
1.77
171
1.77
7
1.14
23
1.13
40
1.07
7
1.14
33
1.09
50
1.06
7
1
37
1.08
57
1.10
14
1.07
33
1.03
8
1.25
14
1.28
27
1.22

running
reduced EG
1.87
4.88
2.53
4.09
74.97
64.05
32.32
24.5
9.59
137.84
187.26
167.93
183.15
124.49
8.55
8.06
6.4
23.09
24.19
65.04
63.46
52.17
228.78
369.07
202.01
104.39
0.11
0.04
25.03
1.25
7457.45
25.15
133.01
125.97
72.66
475
274.5
332.63
1135.91
1802.12
17.52
22.25
23.17
30.61
321.11

time (in seconds)
Bomze improvement
38.48
20.57
210.89
43.21
791.95
313.02
560.24
136.97
43.95
0.58
18.68
0.29
73.44
2.27
81.89
3.34
35.20
3.67
102.7
0.74
482.56
2.57
141.73
0.84
202.99
1.10
360.65
2.89
10.54
1.23
3.71
0.46
11.99
1.87
12.7
0.55
80.13
3.31
34.21
0.52
37.29
0.58
103.67
1.98
476.04
16.54
138.66
0.37
338.95
1.67
465.26
4.45
0.88
8
0.38
9.5
77.07
3.07
8.22
6.57
144000
19.30
70.58
2.80
179.67
1.35
204.94
1.62
87.83
1.20
1158.41
2.43
952.91
3.47
342.48
1.02
2571.32
2.26
5878.11
3.26
26.79
1.52
25.51
1.14
30.97
1.33
86.18
2.81
3649.10
11.36

purturbed the converged point and rerun the dynamics from the new perturb point until
convergence.
The results over 44 different types of graphs from the DIMACS data set are shown in
Table 5.7 (columns labeled “reduced EG”). Since DIMACS graphs have unweighted vertices,
we assigned weights to vertices uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 10}. The obtained results
are evaluated by three metrics: the sum of the weights, the size of the clique and the running
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time needed to converge. We also compared the results with the method using replicator
dynamics in [1] (column labeled “Bomze”), and showed the ratio of our approach to Bomze
in column labeled “improvement”.
For 30 types of graphs, reduced EG finds maximal cliques with sum of weights larger
than ones found by Bomze (37 graphs larger or equal). 29 graphs out of those 37 were
obtained even faster than the ones obtained by Bomze. For instance, for the hamming10-2
with 1024 vertices, the clique obtained by the reduced EG has the sum of weights 1.5 times
the one obtained by Bomze, and it was found almost 20 times faster. Also for c-fat500 graphs
that have 500 vertices and low edge densities (sparse graphs), our method can find cliques
with a sum of weights larger than Bomze and 128 times faster on average. In addition, for
33 types of graphs, our method found maximal cliques with size larger than the ones found
by Bomze (42 graphs larger or equal). On average, our method obtains larger cliques 11
times faster.

5.7.2

MRI Dataset
MRI3-17 is a 3-sequence magnetic resonance (MR) image data set, including proton

density, T1 and T2 images of the brain in the axial plane. The data set consists of an MRI
volume with 96 slices for each of the 3-sequence (512×512) 12-bit images. The images were
first processed to remove air and skull pixels. The remaining pixels in each of the 96 slices
3-sequence images are unrolled into 3-D (one dimension per sequence) feature vectors. These
3-D vectors from each of the 96 slices are combined, creating a data set comprised of about 4
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million (3898407) 3-D objects. Hence, the original dominant set approach needs to calculate
3898407 × 3898407 similarities between each pair of objects which is intractable.
In the following experiments, the data was randomized and divided into 500, 1000,
5000 and 10000 equal sized chunks, i.e. sample sizes in each chunk are 0.2%, 0.1%, 0.02%
and 0.01% of the total number of examples in the data set. Then, the proposed method was
applied. Each experiment was repeated 10 times, and each time a new randomization of the
data was done. Results were averaged over the 10 experiments. It has been implemented in
Matlab m code and run on a machine equipped with 12 cores (p = 12). Figure 5.2.a shows
the average time for p = 12. When the number of chunks k increases, the time complexity for
2

the parallel part decreases to O( |Vkp| ). However, the total number of dominant sets obtained
from all chunks, d, increases which makes the sequential part, i.e. merging them into the
final dominant sets, slower. In fact, in the extreme case, where this is one vertex per chunk,
the sequential part is the same as applying the original method on the entire graph, which
is impractical.
Figure 5.2.b shows the average time for p = 1 (without parallelization), p = 6 and
p = 12. For a fixed number of chunks, as the number of processors p increases, the parallel
2

part becomes faster almost linearly according to O( |Vkp| + δm |Vp | ). Also, for a fixed p, as k
increases, it dominates p and the average time for the parallelizable part becomes linear to
k. Based on Fig 5.2.b, k = 5000 obtains the best timing performance.

74

(a)

(b)

Figure 5.2: Timing analysis of proposed approach on MRI3-17 data set. (a) Time for parallel
and sequential parts when p = 12. (b) Time for parallel and sequential parts for different
number of processors.
5.7.3

Image Segmentation
The problem of image segmentation is an important challenge for the computer vision

community. Segmented images are needed for a wide range of computer vision problems
such as object recognition, image matching, figure-ground separation, etc [22]. There exist
many methods for image segmentation [23, 24, 9, 74, 105, 106, 25, 8] with applications
in many areas. We are focusing on graph based segmentation of images. Graph based
image segmentation methods convert an image into an edge-weighted graph where each
node corresponds to a pixel and the edges connect certain pairs of neighboring pixels. In
this model, the weight of each edge represents the similarity (or dissimilarity) between the
pixels. Depending on the method, there can be an edge between each pair of vertices [23,
24, 8, 80, 25]. Here, we test the approach introduced in Section 5.5 for image segmentation.
First, the image is divided into uniform size contiguous grids and the clusters of each grid
are obtained. Then the resultant subclusters are clustered to merge similar subclusters into
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Figure 5.3: Parallel framework for image segmentation. Segments in each grid are approximated by cliques with different sizes and edge weights based on the corresponding dominant
sets. In this figure, vertices of three segments are colored according to the corresponding
segments’ color.
new clusters. Then pixels are assigned to the final clusters. Figure 5.3 shows a schematic
diagram of the proposed framework.

5.7.3.1

Dataset

In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we applied the method
to the testing set images from the Berkeley Segmentation Database (BSD) [107] that has
100 natural images. BSD also provides ground-truth segmentation results for all the images
obtained from several human subjects. The size of the images was 481 by 321 pixels which
results in a large size similarity matrix of the entire image equal to 154401 × 154401. The
images have been divided into 400 chunks by breaking the image into 20 equal sized rows
and columns.
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Figure 5.4: Histograms of PRI, VOI and BDE scores on BSD testing set images. For PRI,
higher values indicate better segmentation; for VOI and BDE, lower values indicate better
segmentation.
5.7.3.2

Image Features

We used the normalized intensity value in a gray level image segmentation. Also, for
color images, we used both color and a texture descriptor. A texture descriptor based on the
texton theory [108] which was introduced in [109] as a compact, one dimension texton feature
instead of the classic Gabor features [110] which enables us to efficiently represent texture
in the input image. In [108], the definition of textons as cluster centers of high-dimensional
points of filter responses has been provided. In this regard, our color-texton features of every
pixel consist of the original RGB values and a texton feature obtained from the clustering
of Gabor features. To achieve this goal, the texton feature is scaled to the range [0, 255] to
make its range the same as the RGB color features.

5.7.3.3

Performance Metrics

To quantitatively evaluate the performance of our method, we used three metrics
for comparing pairs of image segmentation; the probabilistic Rand index (PRI), variation
of information (VOI) and boundary displacement error (BDE). Where multiple ground-
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truth images were provided, we simply averaged the results of the metric between the test
segmentation and each ground-truth image [111]. The value of σ was chosen to achieve the
best performance with regard to each metric. Particularly, we set σ to 0.1,0.3,0.5,0.9 and
1.5 of the total range of the feature distances. Figure 5.4 shows the histograms of three
criteria on the testing images. The average value for PRI, VOI and BDE are shown in Table
5.8. The results are comparable to those reported in [111] (see Table 5.8). The only two
algorithms that perform better for all three metrics are TBES [111] and UCM [112]. For
instance, our approach is better than multiscale Ncut (MNC) in terms of PRI and VOI. The
advantage of our proposed method is that it gives comparable results to the state of the art
without a training phase, and consequently provides a computational speedup. Also, it can
be done simply in parallel.
Table 5.8: Average values for PRI, VOI and BDE on BSD testing set images. TBES (Texture
and Boundary Encoding-Based Segmentation), MS (Mean-Shift), MCMC (Markov Chain
Monte Carlo), MNC (Multiscale Ncut), CTM (Compression-Based Texture Mergin), UCM
(Ultrametric Contour Maps).
Method\Metric
Our Method
TBES
MS
MCMC
MNC
CTM
UCM

PRI
0.76
0.80
0.77
0.76
0.74
0.75
0.79
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VOI
2.12
1.70
2.00
2.26
2.65
1.89
1.71

BDE
13.86
12.68
13.97
13.89
13.46
10.95
10.95

CHAPTER 6 : CLUSTERING IMPRECISE RELATIONAL DATA1

In real world applications, objects inherently have uncertainty or imprecision associated with them. Different factors contribute to the uncertainty or imprecision describing
the objects such as the collection process, measurement error, and noisy data [113]. Moving
objects are monitored occasionally, such that at a certain time the location of an object is
not explicitly known [114]. Data uncertainty has been classified into two categories, that is
existential and value uncertainties. In existential uncertainty, the existence of an attribute
in an object is expressed as a probability that shows the confidence of its presence. In
value based uncertainty, an example is defined on a bounded or unbounded region associated with a probability density function. Value based uncertainty can be used to quantify
the imprecision of location and geometric properties of data objects.
Similar to when the objects have no associated uncertainty, a typical and fundamental question is how to cluster uncertain objects. There exist different methods for clustering uncertain data in the literature [115], including partitioning clustering approaches
[113, 116, 117], density-based clustering approaches [118, 119] and possible world approaches
[120]. The methods are generally extensions of clustering algorithms designed for data without associated uncertainty or imprecision. Partitioning clustering approaches extend the
k-means method by introducing the expected distance between an uncertain object and a
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point (cluster center). Density based clustering approaches incorporate probabilities in the
DBSCAN [5] and OPTICS [121] methods. Also, in the possible world based approaches, a set
of possible worlds [122] are sampled. Each possible world consists of an instance from each
object and a simple clustering method is applied to each possible world. Finally, the clustering results on all sampled possible worlds are aggregated into a single partition. Reviews
may be found in [123].
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the analysis of imprecise
or fuzzy data. In this regard, there are many attempts to cluster uncertain data modeled by
fuzzy numbers or belief functions [124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129]. Mostly, geometric clustering
methods related to the Fuzzy C means (FCM) algorithm have been used. The cluster
centers and the membership degrees of each object in the clusters are computed iteratively
by optimizing a within-cluster variance criterion. Also, there have been reported clustering
results where the attributes can have numeric interval values [130, 131, 132, 133]. In addition,
in [134], a belief function framework was introduced for clustering proximity data where
the pairwise similarities are expressed as intervals. Particularly, the uncertainties in the
feature values of the objects can be reflected in their pairwise similarities (distances). Also,
when a feature-based description of objects is difficult to obtain or not adequate for the
application, it might be possible to obtain a measure of similarities between objects that
contain uncertainties. The obtained uncertain similarities can be modeled with probabilistic
or possibilistic distributions. Possibility distributions, the basis of the possibility theory,
were initially introduced by Zadeh [135] and advanced by Dubois and Prade [136]. Possibility
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theory is an uncertainty theory handling the situations where the information is incomplete.
It differs from probability theory by the use of two set functions, i.e. possibility and necessity
measures. The reader may find a comprehensive review of possibility theory in [137].
Ignoring the uncertainties in clustering, e.g. replacing uncertain values by their expectations, may weaken the quality of the result. However, by considering the uncertainties
directly in the clustering task, one can specify the reliability of the result by giving the user
a sense about its quality and an intuition of its possibility of being similar to the actual
result of clustering when applied to the true (but unknown) data points [138]. To illustrate
the issue that arises with uncertain data, consider the example given in Fig 6.1. Figure 6.1.a
shows a dataset containing five data points, that correspond to the positions of five moving
objects at time t. Applying a clustering algorithm may give the clusters as shown in Fig
6.1.b. However, the true locations of the objects could be unknown and the last reported
observations of these objects are the only accessible item. Hence, an uncertain representation
of data is commonly used to capture the possible locations of an object. In Fig 6.1.c, data
points are defined on bounded regions. In this case, each object can be in different locations
bounded by its specified region. Fig 6.1.d shows two different possible worlds of the objects,
and their corresponding clusters. As we can see, the clustering results may vary significantly.
In fact, this is because the distance between any two data points is not a single value anymore. They are similar (dissimilar) to each other with different values and corresponding
possibilities. For simplicity of modeling and calculation, we study the case of interval valued
similarities between objects. In fact, the similarity between two uncertain objects is modeled
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a) True object attribute
values.

b) Clusters given true
object attribute values.

c) Bounded observations
for objects.

d) Possible clusters due to
imprecise location of objects.

Figure 6.1: Uncertain clustering example. a, b) a dataset containing five examples and a
possible clustering result. c) when examples are imprecise and defined on bounded regions.
d) each example can be in different locations bounded by its specified region; two different
possible worlds of the objects, and their corresponding clusters.
by an interval that captures its possible values. We show that this formulation of uncertainty
is well suited for our proposed framework. The proposed method can be generalized to all
kinds of uncertainty distributions.

6.1

Sources of Uncertainties
In real world applications, the similarities between every pair of objects may contain

uncertainty. This may happen because of the following reasons [139]:

1. The numerical objects have uncertain feature vectors. This type of data may describe
sets of entities, the range of variables observed in a certain period of time or represent
measurement error. For example, interval-valued variables are needed when an object
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represents a group of individuals, and the variables used to describe them need to be
interval values which express the inherent variability in the description of a group.
2. Similarity judgments are collected from several individuals or devices. As a result, the
similarity between each pair of objects is characterized by an empirical distribution.
3. Similarities are directly extracted from human subjects who may not have quantified
the similarity of pairs of objects by a precise value.

6.2

Problem Formulation
Converting uncertain data to a graph representation is equivalent to having uncertain

edge weights such that each edge has multiple values [68]. These types of graphs are called
multigraphs in the graph theory literature. Due to the uncertainties involved, the notion of
a cluster is not well defined in multigraphs. On the other hand, replacing uncertain edge
weights by certain values, may weaken the quality of the results. Thus, in this chapter, using
evolutionary game theory, we consider the uncertainties directly in the clustering task. We
determine the possibility of the result by giving a sense about its quality and an intuition
of how likely it is that discovered clusters are similar to the actual clusters when applied to
the true (but unknown) data points. In particular, we show that each weighted combination
of vertices can construct a cluster with a degree between zero and one, that we call cluster
degree. A function is introduced that, for every weighted combination of vertices, provides a
degree which represents the possibility of being a cluster. To do this, we cast the uncertain
clustering problem into an uncertain clustering game where the payoffs between every pair
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of strategies is not a certain value. These uncertainties can be modeled by probabilistic
or possibilistic distributions [140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147]. However, for ease of
calculation and computational time, interval valued payoffs would be appropriate in order
to handle the uncertainties, e.g the intervals can be obtained from the confidence intervals
of probability distributions or the α-cuts of possibility distributions [148].
We will show that, when the intervals have zero width, i.e. when data are certain,
the proposed uncertain clustering game corresponds to the clustering game in [9]. This
observation shows the proposed model is a proper generalization of the clustering game. On
the other hand, when the intervals have infinite width, then every subset of vertices can make
a cluster with the same degree. From a practical point of view, we also develop a dynamics
inspired by the Darwinian selection process in order to obtain the subsets of vertices that
have the highest cluster degrees. Finally, an attractive feature of the proposed model is
that it imposes no constraint on the structure of the pairwise similarity matrix, being able
to deal with asymmetric and negative similarities. Since the principal work of Tversky
[149], many psychological studies suggest that human similarity judgments are non metric,
in particular asymmetric. Non metric similarities also arise in many practical applications,
such as comparing shapes [150] and protein sequences [151]. Even the directed Hausdorff
distance between sets, and the Kullback-Leiber divergence between probability distributions
are asymmetric. It has been shown that relaxing non metric similarities may destroy relevant
information and non metricity is a must due to the nature of the problem.
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6.3

Uncertain Clustering Game
An instance of the uncertain clustering problem can be described by an uncertain

edge-weighted graph G̃ = (V, Ã), where the edge weights have uncertainties, or, equivalently,
elements of its similarity matrix are uncertain. Here, we assume that the uncertainties
are expressed in terms of interval values, that is all ãij are intervals represented by triple
[lij , cij , uij ] where cij =

lij +uij
.
2

Although the lower and upper bounds are sufficient to

represent an interval, we will show later that the center value plays an important role in the
proposed framework. In fact, the deviation from the center value results from the imprecision
involved in the problem.
Now, given an interval valued edge-weighted graph G̃ = (V, Ã), representing an instance of an uncertain clustering problem, we cast it into an uncertain clustering game
G̃ = (S, Ã) where the players’ pure strategies correspond to the objects to be clustered,
i.e. S = V , and the uncertain payoff matrix is equal to the interval valued similarity matrix. Figure 6.2 abstracts the uncertain clustering game model for a simple graph with three
vertices. Furthermore, let’s define a realization of G̃ = (S, Ã) as a certain clustering game
G = (S, A), where A = (aij ) is its certain payoff matrix such that aij ∈ ãij . The set of all
such realizations is denoted by F.
One possible way to find the clusters of G̃ is to obtain the clusters of each realization
and aggregate the solutions into final results. The problem of combining multiple clustering
results into a single partition has received considerable attention in the form of ensemble
clustering [67]. However, the number of realizations in F can be infinite. In addition, if
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𝑠1

𝑠2

𝑠3

𝑠1

𝑎11

𝑎12

𝑎13

𝑠2

𝑎21

𝑎22

𝑎23

𝑠3

𝑎31

𝑎32

𝑎33

Figure 6.2: The workflow of the uncertain clustering game. The graph G = (V, Ã) with
V = {v1 , v2 , v3 } and uncertain edge weights is transformed into a game G = (S, Ã) with
S = {s1 , s2 , s3 } and uncertain payoffs. The game is represented in matrix form where each
cell determines an uncertain payoff.
the interval valued similarities were obtained from an uncertain numerical data set, then
every realization in F may not be an Euclidean matrix. Particularly, the Euclidean Distance
Geometry problem [152, 153] in graph theory can be stated as follows.
Given an integer k > 0 and an undirected graph G = (V, A) with vertex set V and
similarity matrix A. The goal is to specify whether there is a function f : V → Rk such that

∀{vi , vj } ∈ V, ||f (vi ) − f (vj )|| = aij

(6.1)

where ||.|| is the Euclidean norm in Rk .
Simply speaking, we say that a matrix A ∈ Rn×n is Euclidean if there exist n points
x1 , ..., xn in Rk such that aij = ||xi − xj ||. The main result in EDG proved by Schoenberg
[154] is a matrix criterion that determines whether a given symmetric matrix with zeros on
the diagonal and positive elements is an Euclidean matrix. Specifically, let’s define P =
I − (1/n)J, where I is the n × n identity matrix and J is the n × n matrix that has all of its
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elements as one. Then A is an Euclidean matrix if and only if P AP is negative semidefinite.
As a result, there might not be an Euclidean realization for every realization of an uncertain
clustering game. However, we assume that the similarity values between every pair of vertices
can have all possible values in its corresponding interval, independent of the values for all
other pairs of vertices.

6.3.1

Cluster Stability
In order to narrow down the size of F, we consider a specific subset of F. In particular,

the lower, center and upper realizations GL = (S, AL ), GC = (S, AC ) and GU = (S, AU ) are
defined as three certain clustering games with certain payoff matrices AL = (lij ), AC = (cij )
and AU = (uij ), respectively. Using these three realizations, we define the set C = {Aδ | Aδ =
δAL + (1 − δ)AU , ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]} as the set of all δ-realizations of the similarity matrix Ã.
Now, we study how the clusters of each realization in C change with respect to δ.
Before showing the stability of clusters, we review an important notion in game theory: we
say that a Nash equilibrium of a game is essential if there exists a nearby Nash equilibrium
for any nearby game [85]. A game is essential if all of its equilibriums are essential. In a
seminal work, Wu and Jiang in [155] proved that almost all finite strategic-form games are
essential. For those games that are not essential, Wu and Jiang also proved that every finite
game can be closely approximated by an essential game. Similar properties can be stated for
an ESS. More precisely, if x is an ESS, then it is a symmetrically essential equilibrium [156]
(A Nash equilibrium x of a symmetric game with payoff matrix A is symmetrically essential
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if any symmetric game with payoff matrix close to A has a symmetric equilibrium close to
x).
From the above robustness concept, we can see that how a cluster is defined in terms
of an equilibrium is a stable notion with respect to the deviation of the similarity matrix.
More formally, let x be a cluster of Aδ . Then, x changes continuously as δ changes. Hence,
if we consider the center realization as the representative similarity matrix, then we would
have a symmetric deviation around the center realization that leads to the lower and upper
realizations. We illustrate the above observation through a simple graph shown in Fig 6.3.a.
The only cluster of the graph is the equilibrium x = (0.24, 0.39, 0.37, 0, 0) with vertices 1,2
and 3 participating. In order to show that the cluster is stable with respect to the edge’s
uncertainties, we create two interval valued edge weighted graphs by adding noise to the
edge weights of the certain graph in Fig 6.3.a (each edge has a different noise level). The
first graph has a noise level in the range of [-10, 10] (Fig 6.3.b) on its edge weights, and
the second graph has a noise level in the range of [-100, 100] (Fig 6.3.c). Then, we plot the
clusters of different δ-realizations.
The clusters of the δ-realizations for the graph in Fig 6.3.b are almost the same as
the clusters of the unperturbed graph (Fig 6.3.a), which indicates the stability of the cluster
with a fair deviation of the edge weights. However, for the graph in Fig 6.3.c, i.e. a severe
noise level (for instance the weights of some of the edges changed by a factor of 11), vertex 1
drops from the cluster for δ ≥ 0.8. In fact, since for δ ≥ 0.8 the lower realization dominates
in Aδ , vertices 2 and 3 are more similar to each other than to vertex 1 in the lower realization.
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Figure 6.3: Cluster stability analysis of uncertain graphs. a) certain graph. b,c) interval
valued edge weighted graphs centered on the edge weights of the original graph. d) the degree
of belonging for the vertices in the support of the cluster of Aδ for the uncertain graph in
(b). e) the degree of belonging for the vertices in the support of the cluster of Aδ for the
uncertain graph in (c).
6.3.2

Uncertain Average Population Payoff
In this subsection, contrary to the ensemble clustering idea, we focus on the average

population payoff. Consider the quadratic programming problem for the uncertain clustering
game G̃ = (S, Ã)
max

uÃ (x, x)

x

(6.2)

subject to x ∈ ∆n
From the objective function in (6.2), we can show the average population payoff
uÃ (x, x) is not a certain value. Each of the lower, center and upper realizations lead to certain
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average population payoffs, that give the minimum, average and the maximum payoffs that
are obtainable. As a result, the true but unknown average population payoff is in the interval
[uAL (x, x), uAC (x, x), uAU (x, x)], i.e.

uAL (x, x) ≤ uÃ (x, x) ≤ uAU (x, x)

(6.3)

Using this interpretation, we compare interval valued average population payoffs in
order to find the clusters with the highest possibility. The possibility that one interval is
less than another will be investigated. There are several different methods for comparing
possibilistic distributions in the context of fuzzy set theory. Here, we use the satisfaction
function [157, 158, 159], which provides a truth value for comparison between fuzzy values
[148]. Hence, since the interval values are a special case of fuzzy values, two intervals can
be compared using the satisfaction function. Let’s denote an interval I = [l, c, u] by its
membership function µI as

µI (m) =






1 if l ≤ m ≤ u

(6.4)





0 otherwise
Then, the following relation is the satisfaction function between two intervals I1 and
I2 , where SF (I1 < I2 ) determines the possibility of the truth of I1 < I2 .
R∞ Rn
−∞
SF (I1 < I2 ) = R−∞
∞ R∞
−∞

−∞

µI1 (m) Θ µI2 (n) dm dn
µI1 (m) Θ µI2 (n) dm dn
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(6.5)

𝑙1
𝑙2

𝑢1

𝑙1

𝑢2

𝑙2

a) case 1

𝑙1

𝑙2

𝑢1
𝑢2

b) case 2

𝑢1

𝑙1

𝑢2

𝑢1
𝑙2

c) case 3

𝑢2

d) case 4

Figure 6.4: Different possible cases for two intervals I1 and I2 if c1 ≥ c2 .
in which Θ is a T-norm operator [148]. We use the multiplication operator as the T-norm
to simplify calculations.
Although we can use any ranking method to compare interval values, the satisfaction
function has some nice properties that make it suitable for our purpose. First, it outputs a
real value that describes the possibility of the truth of the ranking. Also, the authors in [159]
proved that for any two fuzzy values with symmetric membership functions, their centers
determine the SF between them. We do not have fuzzy values but do have intervals (which
could be defined by a fuzzy membership function). As a result, in our case, suppose I1 and
I2 are intervals with centers at c1 and c2 , respectively. Then SF (I2 < I1 ) ≥ 0.5, if and only
if c2 ≤ c1 . For example, consider two intervals I1 and I2 with centers c1 and c2 such that
c1 ≥ c2 as depicted in Fig 6.4. There are 4 different possible cases, which are (u2 ≤ l1 ),
(l2 ≤ l1 and l1 < u2 < u1 ), (l2 < l1 and u1 < u2 ) and (l1 < l2 and u2 < u1 ).
Taking into account the above explanation, in the rest of this section, we identify a
new paradigm for the clustering of uncertain data. We explain this new paradigm from the
graph theory point of view using the proposed uncertain clustering game model.
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6.3.3

Cluster Degree
Consider an uncertain edge-weighted graph G̃ = (V, Ã) that is transformed into the

uncertain clustering game G̃ = (S, Ã). Also, assume that the n-tuple w = (w1 , ..., wn )T
belongs to the simplex ∆, wherein wi represents the membership degree of vertex vi to w.
We call w a weighted combination of vertices. It is clear that w is equivalent to a mixed
strategy. Now, we define the cluster degree for w, represented by d(w), as follows

d(w) = min SF (uÃ (y, w) ≤ uÃ (w, w))
y∈∆
y6=w

(6.6)

In this setting, any weighted combination of vertices can make a cluster with some
degree. The assigned degrees model the uncertainties involved in the similarities between
the vertices. The function in (6.6) basically shows the distribution of cluster degrees in the
entire simplex. We will show that as the uncertainties increase (decrease), the certainty of
answering the question “what objects together make a cluster” decreases (increases). Also,
in the case of having a graph with certain edge weights, a weighted combination of vertices
has non-zero cluster degree if and only if it is an equilibrium. Hence, this model can be
considered as a generalization of dominant set clustering for uncertain graphs. At the other
extreme, if all edge weights have infinite uncertainty, i.e. the width of the intervals are
infinite, then all possible weighted combinations of vertices can make a cluster, and they all
have equal degree.
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6.4
6.4.1

Cluster Degrees Over the Simplex
Theoretical Properties
Now, before establishing some important properties of the proposed model, we review

the principal characteristic of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: A mixed strategy is a best
response to itself if and only if all strategies in its support are also the best responses. In
other words, a mixed strategy x is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ σ(x),
uA (ei , x) = uA (x, x), and for all i ∈
/ σ(x), uA (ei , x) ≤ uA (x, x). Hence, the payoff for every
strategy in the support of x is the same, while all strategies outside the support of x earn a
payoff less than or equal to uA (x, x). This simple fact reveals the subtle nature of the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium which is that players mix pure best response strategies in order
to allow other players a range of best responses that maintain the equilibrium. Based on the
above principal characteristic of an equilibrium, we present the following theorems for the
proposed uncertain clustering game.
Theorem 6.4.1. For every w ∈ bd(∆) in an uncertain clustering game, d(w) ≤ 0.5. Also
for any pure strategy i, d(ei ) ≤ 1.

Proof. Let’s prove this by contradiction. Assume there is a probability distribution w ∈
bd(∆), such that
d(w) > 0.5

(6.7)

SF (uÃ (y, w) ≤ uÃ (w, w)) > 0.5

(6.8)

or equivalently, ∀y 6= w
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Then the center of the interval uÃ (w, w) is greater than the center of the interval
uÃ (y, w), i.e.
cuÃ (y,w) < cuÃ (w,w) , ∀y 6= w

(6.9)

Now, both the left and right hand sides of the above non-equality are the payoffs
when players play the center realization game with payoff matrix AC , i.e.

uAC (y, w) < uAC (w, w), ∀y 6= w

(6.10)

Hence, w would be an equilibrium for the center realization which is a certain clustering game. But, we know that every pure strategy in the support of a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium also attains the same expected payoff, which is a contradiction to (6.7). Hence,
every mixed strategy has degree of being a cluster less than or equal to 0.5. However, any
pure strategy can have a cluster degree less than or equal to 1.



Here, we study the effect of the uncertain similarities on the cluster degrees. When
all similarities are certain values, the average population payoff is not an interval, but a
certain value. As a result, we show that a weighted combination of vertices has a nonzero
cluster degree if and only if it is an equilibrium. This makes the proposed model a proper
generalization of the dominant set framework.
Theorem 6.4.2. For any w ∈ ∆, d(w) = 0 or d(w) ≥ 0.5 in an uncertain clustering game
G̃ = (S, Ã) when all elements of the payoff matrix are certain values.
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Proof. Since all elements of the payoff matrix are certain values, then the lower, center
and upper realization games have the same payoff matrix AC . As a result, the average
population payoff is a certain value. Hence, if uAC (y, w) > uAC (w, w) then SF (uÃ (y, w) <
uÃ (w, w)) = 0, and if uAC (y, w) = uAC (w, w) then SF (uÃ (y, w) < uÃ (w, w)) = 0.5. As a
result, if w is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then ∀y ∈ ∆, uAC (y, w) ≤ uAC (w, w) which
implies that d(w) ≥ 0.5. And if w is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, then ∀i ∈ σ(w),
uAC (ei , w) = uAC (w, w) which implies that d(w) = 0.5. Moreover, if w is not a Nash
equilibrium, then ∃y ∈ ∆, uAC (y, w) > uAC (w, w) which implies that d(w) = 0.

6.4.2



Enumeration of Clusters
Although when using the uncertain clustering game, the cluster degrees for all weighted

combination of vertices can be obtained, the user might be interested in finding some representative w’s. In this regard, we define a w as a potential cluster when its cluster degree is
greater or equal than 0.5. For a potential cluster w, the average population payoff uÃ (w, w)
is greater than or equal to the average population payoff uÃ (y, w) for any y 6= w. Now,
the question is whether there exists a potential cluster in any uncertain clustering game G̃.
To answer this question, first we show the relation between the potential clusters of G̃ with
the clusters of Gc . In fact, the potential clusters are essentially the clusters of the center
realization game. And based on the Nash theorem [160], since every realization of G̃ has an
equilibrium, there exists a potential cluster for G̃.
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Theorem 6.4.3. The potential clusters of an uncertain clustering game are the same as the
clusters of its center realization game.

Proof. Consider the center realization game GC = (S, AC ) of the uncertain clustering game
G = (S, Ã). Based on the Nash theorem [40], there is at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium
w in GC . Now we have the following two situations:
1) If w is a pure strategy, then we have

uAC (y, w) ≤ uAC (w, w), ∀y 6= w

(6.11)

SF (uÃ (y, w) ≤ uÃ (w, w)) ≥ 0.5, ∀y 6= w

(6.12)

Thus

Hence, d(w) ≥ 0.5 that implies w is a potential cluster for the uncertain clustering
game.
2) If w is a mixed strategy, then equations (6.11) and (6.12) also holds for w. However,
for every strategy i ∈ σ(w), SF (uÃ (ei , w) ≤ uÃ (w, w)) = 0.5. Hence, we have

d(w) = min SF (uÃ (y, w) ≤ uÃ (w, w)) = 0.5
y∈∆
y6=w

Hence, w is a potential cluster for the uncertain clustering game.

96

(6.13)
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Figure 6.5: Geometric explanation of EltStrDyn. (a) If x is a cluster, all vertices (blue
circles) belonging to the cluster (i.e. support of x) obtain the same payoff uA (x, x), and all
other vertices obtain payoff less than or equal to uA (x, x). As we can see, there is no vertex
in the > uA (x, x) region. (b) How the EltStrDyn works: the vertex v5 (green triangle) is in
the set ρ(x) and obtains the highest payoff for mixed strategy x.
Thus we find the Nash equilibriums of the center realization game in order to find
the potential clusters of the uncertain clustering game. Here, we propose a new class of
dynamics, which we call Elite Strategy Dynamics (EltStrDyn). Simply, the share of the
most successful strategy in the population is increased and the share of remaining strategies
are decreased proportionally, as follows. Consider the function ρ(x) that outputs the elite
strategy with the highest payoff facing a mixed strategy x in a game with payoff matrix
AΨ = A + AT , i.e.
ρ(x) = arg max uAΨ (ej , x)

(6.14)

j

where a tie is randomly broken. Clearly, this elite strategy obtains higher payoff than the
average population payoff, which implies uAΨ (eρ(x) − x, x) ≥ 0. Now, based on this selected
strategy, let’s define the following discrete-time dynamics where xk and xk+1 are x at time
steps k and k + 1, respectively, and δ(xk ) is a constant between 0 and 1.
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xk+1 = δ(xk )(eρ(xk ) − xk ) + xk

(6.15)

Ultimately, the dynamics should work out so that the average population payoff
increases from xk to xk+1 . In order to get the maximum increase, we choose δ that maximizes
the difference between uA (xk+1 , xk+1 ) and uA (xk , xk ). Replacing xk+1 by the relation (6.15),
we derive this difference as follows (for simplicity of notation, δ(xk ) and xk are represented
by δ and x)

uA (xk+1 , xk+1 )−uA (xk , xk )
= δ 2 uA (eρ(x) − x, eρ(x) − x) + δ uA (eρ(x) − x, x) + uA (x, eρ(x) − x)



= δ 2 uA (eρ(x) − x, eρ(x) − x) + δ uA (eρ(x) − x, x) + uAT (eρ(x) − x, x)



= δ 2 uA (eρ(x) − x, eρ(x) − x) + δ uAΨ (eρ(x) − x, x)
(6.16)
Now, since uAΨ (eρ(x) − x, x) ≥ 0, we have two possible cases:

1. if uA (eρ(x) − x, eρ(x) − x) ≥ 0, then the maximum of (6.9) occurs at δ = 1.
2. if uA (eρ(x) − x, eρ(x) − x) < 0, then (6.16) is a concave function with respect to δ. Thus
by setting the derivative of (6.16) to zero with respect to δ, the maximum of (6.16)
happens at δ = min


−uAΨ (eρ(x) −x,x)
,1 .
2uA (eρ(x) −x,eρ(x) −x)

So the ElitStrDyn generates a grows transformation on ∆ for the population payoff
uA (x, x). This result can be seen as a variant of the Theorem of Natural Selection [56].
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However, we establish a strong result for symmetric payoff matrices. In particular, any fixed
point of the ElitStrDyn will be a Nash equilibrium given the payoff matrix is symmetric, i.e.
A = AT .
Theorem 6.4.4. For a symmetric payoff matrix A, x is a fixed point under the EltStrDyn
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.

Proof. Since A is symmetric, then uAΨ (eρ(x) − x, x) = 2uA (eρ(x) − x, x). Now, if x is a fixed
point of the dynamics, then δ(x) = 0 which implies uAΨ (eρ(x) − x, x) = 0. This in turn
means uA (eρ(x) − x, x) = 0. As a result, x is a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if x is a Nash
equilibrium, then uA (eρ(x) − x, x) = 0 and so uAΨ (eρ(x) − x, x) = 0. Consequently, δ(x) = 0,
that implies xk+1 = xk .



Now, depending on the application, one might want to extract either overlapping
or non-overlapping potential clusters. In the latter case, a simple yet effective speeling-off
strategy [19] can be used as follows: 1) find a potential cluster, 2) remove the vertices in
the cluster from the vertex set, and 3) work on the remaining vertices. We keep peeling
off clusters until the desired number of clusters is reached. The drawback of this efficient
enumeration technique is that the obtained clusters may not be the exact clusters of the entire
graph, since in each iteration the graph is changed. Hence, to enumerate the clusters, we
used the proposed approach in Chapter 4 that efficiently finds the clusters (either overlapping
or non-overlapping).
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6.4.3

Computational Aspect: An Approximation
Although, considering the similarities as intervals eases the computational complexity

of the proposed approach, to calculate the cluster degree for w, the satisfaction functions
between w and all other y 6= w ∈ ∆ need to be computed. Hence, we present an approximate
solution to further reduce the computational time. In this regard, we assume all intervals in
the similarity matrix have the same width. As a result, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 6.4.5. Consider an uncertain clustering game G̃ = (S, Ã). Assume the width of
all intervals ãij is a constant value. Let i = arg maxj uAC (ej , w) be the vertex that gets the
highest payoff facing w in the center realization game. Then,

d(w) = SF (uÃ (ei , w) < uÃ (w, w))

(6.17)

Proof. Since i = arg maxj uAC (ej , w), then ∀y ∈ ∆ we have uAC (ei , w) ≥ uAC (y, w). Hence,
the center of the interval uÃ (ei , w) is greater than or equal the center of the interval uÃ (y, w).
Also, ∀y ∈ ∆, we have uAL (y, w) = y T AL w = y T (AC − 0.5K)w = uAC (y, w) − 0.5k where
K is the matrix with k for all elements (similarly, uAU (y, w) = uAC (y, w) + 0.5k). Hence,
∀y ∈ ∆, uÃ (y, w) has the same width k. As a result, it is easy to see that SF (uÃ (ei , w) ≤
uÃ (w, w)) ≤ SF (uÃ (y, w) ≤ uÃ (w, w)).

d(w) = min SF (uÃ (y, w) ≤ uÃ (w, w)) = SF (uÃ (ei , w) ≤ uÃ (w, w))
y∈∆
y6=w

(6.18)
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However, this assumption might be strong for some practical applications (for instance
see the fats and oil data in real-world data sets section). Hence, two alternative approaches
can be adopted. The first approach is to find an uncertain clustering game with payoffs having
the same width that can approximate the true cluster degrees for the original clustering
game. The second one is to find tight upper bounds for the cluster degrees. Here, we follow
the second approach. We check three particular vertices that result in tight upper bounds
and pick the minimum of them. In particular, since we know that d(w) ≤ SF (uÃ (ei , w) <
uÃ (w, w)) for any vertex i, we examine three specific vertices that intuitively give appropriate
upper bounds as follows.

1. The vertex that gains the highest center payoff facing w, i.e. ic = arg maxj uAC (ej , w).
2. The vertex that gains the highest upper payoff facing w, i.e. iu = arg maxj uAU (ej , w).
3. The vertex that gains the highest lower payoff facing w, i.e. il = arg maxj uAL (ej , w).

Intuitively, every w that belongs to ∆ gains an interval valued payoff that has 1)
smaller center than the payoff attains with ic , 2) smaller upper bound than the payoff attains
with iu , 3) smaller lower bound than the payoffs attains with il . Hence, the three selected
vertices would lead to appropriate upper bounds. It should be mentioned that if the width
of all interval valued payoffs are the same, then these three vertices are the same and lead
to the true cluster degree.
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Figure 6.6: An uncertain graph example. a) certain graph. b) uncertain graph
6.5
6.5.1

Experimental Results
Graph Example
We illustrate the proposed framework by an artificial graph example with a small

number of vertices that easily enable us to visualize results. Consider an asymmetric directed
graph with three vertices that has both positive and negative edge weights as shown in Fig
6.6.a. The graph has two clusters x = (0.75, 0.25, 0) and x = (0, 0.4, 0.6). Now consider the
uncertain graph with interval valued edge weights in Fig 6.6.b. The intervals are centered
around the edge weights in Fig 6.6.a with deviation λ. The distributions of cluster degrees
for λ = 0.1, 1 and 2 are plotted in Figs 6.7-6.9.
As Figs 6.7-6.9 show, the cluster degrees for all x ∈ bd(∆) are less than or equal
to 0.5 (Theorem 6.4.1). The uncertain clustering problems have two potential clusters x =
(0.75, 0.25, 0) and x = (0, 0.6, 0.4) (Theorem 6.4.3). Also, there are weighted combinations
of vertices with high cluster degrees (depicted by the reddish colors in Figs 6.7-6.9) that have
three nonzero elements. This means that, the three vertices have a high possibility of being
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(a) the simplex

(b) projection of the simplex on x2 and x3 domains

Figure 6.7: The cluster degrees of the uncertain graph in Figure 6.6.b for λ = 0.1

(a) the simplex

(b) projection of the simplex on x2 and x3 domains

Figure 6.8: The cluster degrees of the uncertain graph in Figure 6.6.b for λ = 1

(a) the simplex

(b) projection of the simplex on x2 and x3 domains

Figure 6.9: The cluster degrees of the uncertain graph in Figure 6.6.b for λ = 2
in a cluster together. In addition, as the uncertainties increase via λ = 0.1 to λ = 2, the
region where they have high degrees become more spread out in the simplex.

6.5.2

Noise Robustness
Here, we test the sensitivity of the uncertain clustering game results to noisy data,

and compare it to the well known spectral clustering algorithm [161]. The experiments were
conducted on six datasets, including Jain, R15 [162], Aggregation, Flame [163] and two UCI
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2𝑙

8𝑙

(1,4)
𝑑−

6𝑙

4𝑙
(3,2)
𝑑+

Figure 6.10: Minimum and maximum distances between two uncertain objects. d− and d+
are the minimum and maximum distances between two objects o1 = (1, 4) and o2 = (3, 2)
for noise level l.
datasets Yeast and Wine. In order to add noise to a data set, we perturbed the feature
values of each data point. Particularly, first we set the noise level l to a value between 0 and
1. Then, for each object oi having p features (fi1 , . . . , fip ), each feature fik ≥ 0 (fik < 0) is
bounded by an interval [(1 − l) fik , fik , (1 + l) fik ] ([(1 + l) fik , fik , (1 − l) fik ]) with length
2lfik . By doing this, we make a p-dimensional box around each object.
To calculate the minimum and maximum distances between each pair of objects,
we used Proposition 1 from [139]. For instance, consider two data points o1 = (1, 4) and
+
o2 = (3, 2). The minimum and maximum distances, d−
12 and d12 , are shown in Fig 6.10. Hence
+
the distance for any pair of objects oi and oj is in the interval [d−
ij , dij ]. To get the similarity

matrices for the lower and upper realizations, we used the exponential kernel function, i.e.
− 2
2
2
2
lij = exp(−(d+
ij ) /2σl ) and uij = exp(−(dij ) /2σu ) where σl and σu are the scaling factors.

We set σl = 0.1d− (σu = 0.1d+ ) where d− (d+ ) is the mean of all pairwise lower (upper)
distances. Now, we consider the δ-realizations of the obtained uncertain similarity matrix.
We partition each δ-realization and compare them to the partitions of the original similarity
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Table 6.1: Comparison of RI and VOI between CG and SC for varying noise level. The
results show the mean and variance over 10 δs by step size 0.1. The lowest variance is in
bold.
Dataset
R15

Jain

Aggregation

Wine

Flame

Yeast

Metrics
RI-CG
RI-SC
VOI-CG
VOI-SC
RI-CG
RI-SC
VOI-CG
VOI-SC
RI-CG
RI-SC
VOI-CG
VOI-SC
RI-CG
RI-SC
VOI-CG
VOI-SC
RI-CG
RI-SC
VOI-CG
VOI-SC
RI-CG
RI-SC
VOI-CG
VOI-SC

l = 0.01
1±0
0.94±0.02
0.02±0.02
0.87±0.16
0.88± 0.14
1± 0
0.51±0.49
0±0
0.84±0.04
0.96±0.06
1.92±0.35
0.34±0.45
0.98±0.05
0.97±0.10
0.19±0.29
0.10±0.23
0.90±0.18
1±0
0.38±0.52
0±0
0.92±0.07
0.99±0.00
1.65±0.75
0±0.00

l = 0.05
0.98±0.02
0.94±0.01
0.39±0.43
0.98±0.22
0.87±0.11
0.97±0.09
0.60±0.42
0.08±0.27
0.84±0.04
0.97±0.03
2.09±0.35
0.26±0.23
0.81±0.12
0.89±0.09
0.91±0.44
0.51±0.16
0.56±0.02
1±0
1.75±0.07
0±0
0.72±0.05
0.99±0.00
3.46±0.09
0.02±0.00

l = 0.1
0.92±0.04
0.77±0.06
1.19±0.56
1.74±0.24
0.72±0.12
0.97±0.08
1.12±0.41
0.15±0.21
0.82±0.06
0.97±0.02
2.17±0.22
0.32±0.15
0.69±0.05
0.80±0.10
1.32±0.10
0.80±0.25
0.51±0.00
0.84±0.05
1.72±0.18
0.46±0.13
0.85±0.02
0.99±0.01
3.69±0.02
0.04±0.06

l = 0.2
0.74±0.06
0.70±0.11
2.23±0.32
2.44±0.40
0.53±0.01
0.88±0.00
1.79±0.15
0.38±0.02
0.78±0.13
0.82±0.18
2.18±0.19
1.13±0.42
0.67±0.06
0.59±0.07
1.27±0.17
1.06±0.17
0.50±0.00
0.97±0.00
1.75±0.22
0.13±0.03
0.76±0.21
0.99±0.02
3.95±0.28
0.07±0.08

matrix. The clustering quality comparison is done by means of two metrics rand index (RI)
and variation of information (VOI). Table 6.1 shows the means and variances of the clustering game and spectral clustering algorithms over 10 δs for noise levels 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2.
For RI, higher values indicate better compatibility; for VOI, lower values indicate better
compatibility.
Although the mean values for each metric represent the compatibility of the clustering
results of an algorithm with the original similarity matrix, here we are more interested in
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the effect of different δs, i.e. the variances. As we can see from Table 6.1, none of the
uncertain clustering game or spectral clustering algorithms dominate the other one. But,
generally, the spectral clustering algorithm is less sensitive to the noisy data for the following
reasons. First, the clustering game model is more appropriate than the spectral clustering
algorithm when the number of clusters is unknown. But to be fair for comparison in the
experiments, we assume the number of clusters is known which degrades the clustering
results of the uncertain clustering game model. In fact, the clustering game model might
naturally prefer a different number of clusters potentially resulting in better performance.
Second, clusters in the clustering game model are dense subsets of data (i.e. the clusters do
not necessarily partition the entire data set), compared to the clusters obtained by spectral
clustering approach. So the way that the objects are assigned to the clusters plays an
important role, which is out of scope of this research work (we used the method in [17]).

6.5.3

Noisy Image Segmentation
Here we study the robustness of the segmentation results by adding random noise to

each pixel of the image, i.e. we add Gaussian noise with zero mean and a fixed variance to the
RGB values of each pixel. To quantitatively evaluate the performance of our method, we used
three metrics for comparing pairs of image segmentation: the probabilistic Rand index (PRI),
variation of information (VOI) and boundary displacement error (BDE). Where multiple
ground-truth images were provided, we simply averaged the results of the metric between
the test segmentation and each ground-truth image [111]. Figure 6.11 shows the histograms
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Figure 6.11: Histograms of PRI, VOI and BDE for original images and noisy images. First,
second and third columns show the histograms of the three metrics for original images,
images with Gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance 1, and images with Gaussian noise
with mean 0 and variance 10, respectively.
Table 6.2: Average values for PRI, VOI and BDE on BSD testing set images.
Original image
Noisy image with variance 1
Noisy image with variance 10

PRI
0.7261
0.7197
0.7192

VOI
2.4687
2.5182
2.5236

BDE
14.2886
14.2747
14.3913

of three criteria for original images, noisy images with Gaussian noise and variance 1, noisy
images with Gaussian noise and variance 10. The average values for PRI, VOI and BDE
are shown in Table 6.2. The average values and the histograms confirm the robustness of
the clustering game to noise in image segmentation. Also, Figure 6.12 shows the results on
several images from the BSD. Segments are differentiated by different grayscale values. The
segments of the original images and images with noise are very similar.
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Figure 6.12: Image segmentation results. The first column shows the original images and
their segmentation results. The second column shows the noisy image with variance 1 and
their segmentation results. The third column shows the noisy image with variance 10 and
their segmentation results.
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CHAPTER 7 : SPECTRAL SPARSIFICATION IN SPECTRAL
CLUSTERING1

Throughout this dissertation, we extensively discussed the standard quadratic program view of clustering large data, that leads to the scalable clustering game framework.
The proposed techniques are mainly useful to find dense clusters in large graphs, where the
number of clusters does not need to be known in advance. The game theoretic formulation
of clustering also provides some well behaved dynamics to find clusters in linear time, as
well as handling the class complexity of clustering problem. However, one might be also
interested in studying a graph from its spectral properties. The graph Laplacian matrix is
the primary tool for spectral clustering. There exists an entire field of study on Laplacian
matrices, called spectral graph theory [164]. In pattern recognition and computer vision,
the work of Shi and Malik [8] on normalized cuts was very important. The best of current
approaches to find clusters are still based on variations on this approach [12].
However, a spectral clustering approach has quadratic time and space complexities
in computing pairwise similarities of data instances and in storing the similarity matrix.
These properties would encounter a quadratic resource bottleneck when the number of data
instances is large. In addition, it requires significant time and memory to compute and store
1

Portions of this chapter were reprinted from International Conference on Pattern Recognition, A. Chakeri, H. Farhidzadeh, L. O. Hall, Spectral Sparsification in Spectral Clustering, Copyright (2016) IEEE
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the first eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix. As a result, there have been several approaches
to ease the computational and memory difficulties [165]. The most common approaches make
the similarity matrix sparse by zeroing out some of its elements. Then, from the sparse
similarity matrix, one can find the corresponding Laplacian matrix and compute its first
eigenvectors by calling a sparse eigensolver such as SLEPc [166] and ARPACK [167].

7.1

Edge Sampling: Common Combinatorial Sparsifiers
Sparisifying a similarity matrix is equivalent to the sparsification of the modeled

graph. There are several popular constructions of a sparsified graph where their goal is to
model the local neighborhood relationships between the data instances. A sparsifier is a
sparse graph on the same vertex set which approximates the original graph in some respect.
The common combinatorial sparsifiers are -neighborhood graphs, k-nearest neighbor graphs
and cut sparsifiers: in the -neighborhood graphs, all data points whose pairwise similarities
are greater than a threshold  are connected. In the k-nearest neighbor graphs, each data
instance is connected to its k nearest neighbor instances. However, this definition leads to
a directed graph, as the neighborhood relationship is not symmetric. As a result, mutual
k-nearest neighbor graphs were used where two instances are connected to each other if they
are in their k nearest neighbors. Also, Benczur and Karger in [168] introduced the notion
of cut sparsifiers. They proposed a class of sparsification algorithms, which yields a sparse
graph that approximately preserves the cut between any two disjoint sets of vertices.
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7.2

Vertex Sampling
Although, sparse matrix representations using the above approaches effectively reduce

the memory complexity, they still require calculating all elements of the similarity matrix.
Also, they inherently depend on the parameter selection, i.e.  and k, or it is NP-hard to
approximately compute the cut-similarity between two graphs. As a result, a totally different
approach to speed up spectral clustering to consider is by means of sampling the important
data instances. Particularly, Fowlkes et al in [169] used the Nyström approximation to
obtain a dense submatrix of the entire similarity matrix to avoid calculating the entire
pairwise similarities. The Nyström method finds an approximate eigendecomposition of the
Laplacian matrix. However, some studies [170, 171] show that the approximation yields
inferior results compared to the k-nearest neighbor method. Specifically, a sparse matrix
representation does not lose much information, and also insignificant pairwise similarity
values are rejected. In contrast, there is no evidence which shows the approximation for the
Nyström method may provide comparable quality results to using the entire dense matrix.

7.3

Spectral Sparsification: Approximation Guarantor
Considering that the above sparsifiers will finally work with the sparsified Laplacian

matrix, there is no approximation guarantee on preserving the spectral properties of the original Laplacian matrix. Thus, we employ the strongest notion of sparsification called spectral
sparsification [172, 173]; a graph H is a spectral sparsifier of the graph G if the quadratic
forms induced by the Laplacians of G and H approximate one another well. This notion is
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strictly stronger than the earlier concept of combinatorial sparsifications. In particular, the
Laplacian of a graph relates to its connectivity, and graphs with similar Laplacian matrices
have similar cut values and other important combinatorial properties. In this regard, we use
the spectral sparsification algorithm with sampling by effective resistance [174] to sparsify the
graph. Then the sparsified graph is clustered using a recursive two-way clustering method.
We analyze the effect of spectral sparsification on the final clustering results. We show that
the Fiedler vector of the sparsifier, i.e. the eigenvector for the second-smallest eigenvalue of
its Laplacian, can still partition the graph well compared to the original Fiedler vector. As
a result, a recursive two-way spectral clustering on the sparsifier gives very similar results to
the clusters of the original graph.

7.3.1

Background on Spectral Clustering
Let’s denote a weighted graph by a 3-tuple, G = (V, E, w), with vertex set V =

{v1 , . . . , vn }, edge set E = {(u, v)|u, v ∈ V } and weights w(u,v) > 0 for each (u, v) ∈ E. The
similarity matrix of the graph G is denoted by the symmetric matrix W = (w(u,v) ). The
Laplacian matrix of G is defined by

LG (u, v) =






−w(u,v)

if u 6= v



P


 z w(u,z)

if u = v

(7.1)

The Laplacian matrix is a symmetric and positive semi-definite matrix with nonnegative, real-valued eigenvalues 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λn . The smallest eigenvalue of LG
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for a connected graph G is 0, and its corresponding eigenvector is the constant vector 1. In
addition, the multiplicity of eigenvalue 0 is equal to the number of connected components of
the graph.
The intuition of partitioning a graph into several groups is to cut a graph such that
the edges crossing different groups have low weights compared to the edges within groups. In
this regard, the conductance of a cut measures the edge weights on both sides of the cut and
the edge weights crossing those sides. The conductance of a graph is defined as the minimum
of conductance among all cuts. A graph with low conductance has low connectivity, and one
is able to partition the graph into two disjoint dissimilar sets of vertices. Interestingly, graph
conductance is closely related to the second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix
according to Cheeger’s inequality [175]. In particular, consider the eigenvector associated
with the second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix which is called the Fiedler vector.
Fiedler [176] realized that this vector can be used to partition the underlying graph into two
groups. The precedure can be done recursively on each group until reaching to the desired
number of partitions.

7.3.2

Edge Sampling By Effective Resistance
Given the graph G = (V, E, w), the Laplacian quadratic form induced by G is defined

as the function fG (x) from Rn to R such that

fG (x) =

X

w(u,v) (x(u) − x(v))2

(u,v)∈E
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(7.2)

The Laplacian quadratic form for a graph G can also be written as

fG (x) = xT LG x

(7.3)

We say two graphs G = (V, w) and H = (V, ŵ) are σ spectrally similar if their induced
quadratic form can approximate one another well [173], i.e.

fG (x)/σ ≤ fH (x) ≤ σ · fG (x), for all x ∈ Rn

(7.4)

Two spectrally similar graphs have many similar algebraic properties. For instance in
spectrally similar graphs, the effective resistance between every pairs of vertices are similar
[173]. In particular, the entire graph can be viewed as an electrical circuit, where an edge
of weight w becomes a resistor of resistance 1/w. Then the effective resistance between two
vertices is defined as the electrical resistance between them. The effective resistance between
vertices u and v, in terms of the Laplacian matrix, can be written as

R(u,v) =

1
min
x:x(u)=1,x(v)=0

fG (x)

(7.5)

Now, a (σ, d) spectral sparsifier of a graph G is a graph H such that 1) H is σ
spectrally similar to G, 2) the edges of H are reweighted edges of G and 3) H has at most
d|V | edges. By means of the effective resistance to define the edge sampling probabilities,
the authors in [174] proved that every graph has a ((1 + ), O(log n/2 )) spectral sparsifier.
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They proved that sampling with edge probability, p(u,v) , proportional to w(u,v) R(u,v) leads to
the right sampling distribution building a spectral sparsifier. They proposed Algorithm 7.1
for generating a sparsifier of G.
Algorithm 7.1: ((1 + ), O(log n/2 )) spectral sparsifier
Input : G = (V, w)
Output: H = (V, ŵ)
Set H to be the graph on V with no edges;
for i = 1 to N = O(n log n/2 ) do
Sample edge (u, v) with probability p(u,v) proportional to w(u,v) R(u,v)
add (u, v) to H with weight 1/N p(u,v)

7.4

A Mixed Model: Sparsified Spectral Clustering
In order to ease the computational complexity of a spectral clustering method, we

want to obtain a smaller graph that preserves some crucial property of the input graph. In
fact, we want to approximately preserve the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the graph Laplacian. Particularly, we show that the spectral sparsification algorithm that approximately
preserves the Laplacian quadratic form, implies spectral approximations for the Laplacian
of the original graph [177]. This means that we can obtain computational efficiency as well
as an approximation guarantee, compared to some other combinatorial sparsification such
as k-nearest neighbor for which an approximation guarantee is not provided.
Theorem 7.4.1. Consider the Laplacian eigenvalues 0 ≤ λ̂1 ≤ · · · ≤ λ̂n of the graph H
which is a ((1+), O(log n/2 )) spectral sparsifier of the graph G having Laplacian eigenvalues
0 ≤ λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λn . Then λi /(1 + ) ≤ λ̂i ≤ (1 + )λi , for all i.
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Proof. Since LG and LH are symmetric matrices, based on the Courant-Fisher theorem, we
have
λi =

λ̂i =

minn

max

xT L G x
xT x

(7.6)

minn

max

xT L H x
xT x

(7.7)

T ⊆R
dim(T )=n−i+1

T ⊆R
dim(T )=n−i+1

x∈T

x∈T

In addition, since H is (1 + ) spectrally similar to G, then for all x ∈ Rn

xT LG x/(1 + ) ≤ xT LH x ≤ (1 + ) xT LG x

Hence from (6-8), for all i, λi /(1 + ) ≤ λ̂i ≤ (1 + )λi .

(7.8)



Now the question is how close the partitions of a sparsifier are to the partitions of the
original graph. Or equivalently, to some extent how the Fiedler vector of a sparsifier differs
from the Fiedler vector of the original graph. To answer this question, first we know from
a result in [178, 179], any vector whose Rayleigh quotient is close to the second-smallest
eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix can also be used to find a good partition. Such a vector
is called an approximate Fiedler vector [179].
Definition 7.4.1. For a Laplacian matrix LG with the second-smallest eigenvalue λ2 , y is
an (1 + ) approximate Fiedler vector if
y T LG y
≤ (1 + )λ2
yT y
such that y T 1 = 0
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(7.9)

The observation in [179] motivates the following theorem. Based on Theorem 7.4.2,
we can see that the Fiedler vector of the sparsifier can be used to find a good partition of
the original graph with some approximation guarantee.
Theorem 7.4.2. The Fiedler vector of the ((1 + ), O(log n/2 )) spectral sparsifier of G is
an (1 + )2 approximate Fiedler vector of G.
0

Proof. Assume ϕ2 and ϕ2 are the Fiedler vectors of G and its sparsifier H, respectively, that
are orthogonal to constant vector 1. Then, according to the Courant-Fisher theorem, we
have
λ2 =

ϕT2 LG ϕ2
ϕT2 ϕ2
0

(7.10)
0

(ϕ )T LH ϕ
λ2 = 2 0 T 0 2
(ϕ2 ) ϕ2
0

(7.11)

In addition, from Theorem 7.4.1, we know that λ2 /(1 + ) ≤ λ̂2 ≤ (1 + )λ2 . As a
result,
0

0

(ϕ2 )T LH ϕ2
≤ (1 + ) λ2
0
0
(ϕ2 )T ϕ2

(7.12)

0

0

0

0

Also, since H is (1 + ) spectrally similar to G, then (ϕ2 )T LG ϕ2 /(1 + ) ≤ (ϕ2 )T LH ϕ2 .
Thus
0

0

(ϕ2 )T LG ϕ2
≤ (1 + )2 λ2
0 T
0
(ϕ2 ) ϕ2
0

This implies that ϕ2 is an (1 + )2 approximate Fiedler vector of G.
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Figure 7.1: A sparsified graph example. a) Original graph G. Its second-smallest eigenvalue is
91.5, and the normalized Fiedler vector is ϕ2 = (0.21, 0.23, 0.35, −0.88, 0.08)T . b) 3-spectral
0
sparsifier H. Its second-smallest eigenvalue is 37.2, and the normalized Fiedler vector is ϕ2 =
0
0
0
(0.26, 0.14, 0.35, −0.88, 0.12)T . The Rayleigh quotient for ϕ2 is (ϕ2 )T LG ϕ2 = 93.26 ≤ 9λ2 as
 is 2 for (1 + )2 λ2 . Copyright (2016) IEEE.
For instance, consider the graph G shown in Fig 7.1.a. Its Fiedler vector, ϕ2 , partitions
G into two clusters {1, 2, 3, 5} and {4}. The sparsifier, H, for  = 2 is shown in Fig 7.1.b. As
0

we can see, the edges of H are reweighted edges of G. Also, its Fiedler vector, ϕ2 , partitions
H into the same clusters as in G. We can see that the Rayleigh quotient for the Fiedler
vector of H is very close to the second-smallest eigenvalue of G, confirming it can still be
used to find good partitions.

7.4.1

Cluster Structure Preservation
When we use the combinatorial sparsification such as k-nearest neighbor to sparsify

a graph, every vertex in the sparsifier would be connected to at least one vertex for any k.
However, this is not always the case for the spectral sparsifiers. As  becomes higher, the
number of sampled edges becomes lower which makes the sparsifier very sparse. In particular,
in a spectral sparsifier, there might exist some vertices that have degree of zero, i.e. isolated
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Figure 7.2: Cluster structure preservation. a) Aggregation data set. b,c,d) Sparsified Aggregation data for  = 2, 10, 25. The number of preserved data points are 788, 517 and 127,
respectively. e) Jain data set. f,g,h) Sparsified Jain data for  = 2, 10, 25. The number of
preserved data points are 373, 228 and 52, respectively. Copyright (2016) IEEE.
vertices. As a result, all of the elements in the corresponding rows and columns in the
similarity matrix are zero. Hence, one might need to use an out of sample extension method
to assign the vertices with degree zero to the final clusters by means of a distance criterion.
However, this characteristic is actually a nice property. In the experimental section, we will
show that even for a reasonably large , the underlying structure of a data set is preserved
by the sparsifier. In other words, the sparsifier more likely contains vertices from all of the
clusters of the graph. To explain why this happens, intuitively the vertices in a cluster are
closely connected to each other which makes the effective resistance between them high. This
in turn increases the probability of sampling the edges among the vertices in a cluster. As a
result, a sparsifier will more likely have vertices from all clusters of the original graph. For
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instance, consider the Aggregation [180] and Jain [181] data set consisting 788 and 373 data
points each having 2 features with 7 and 2 clusters, respectively. The original data points are
plotted in Fig 7.2.a and 7.2.e. Fig 7.2 also shows the preserved data points by the spectral
sparsification for  = 2, 10, 25. Preserved data points are the data points that have non zero
degrees in a sparsifier. As we can see, even for large , the sparsified data still retains the
underlying cluster structures of the original data set.

7.5

Experimental Results
In this section, we test our proposed framework on different datasets. The data clus-

tering experiments are conducted on seven datasets, including Aggregation, Jain, Pathbased
[182], Flame [163], R15 [162], D31 [162] and one UCI data set, Yeast. In building similarity
matrices for all data sets from feature vectors, we used the similarity measure between two
data points oi and oj in the form of exp(− oi − oj

2
2

/2σ 2 ) where σ is the scaling parameter.

We set σ = 0.1d¯ where d¯ is the mean of all pairwise distances.
First, we compare the results of our approach with the results of applying spectral
clustering on the original graphs to show compatibility, and evaluate the effects of spectral
sparsification. The clustering quality comparison by means of rand index (RI), variation
of information (VOI) and global consistency error (GCE) for different  are presented in
Table 7.1. Since, the algorithm inherently involves a random sampling scheme, we report
the average of the results over 100 experiments. However, since an out of sample extension
method [183] needs to be performed for large ’s, we only consider in Table 7.1 the range of
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Table 7.1: Comparing results of spectral sparsifiers for varying  and original data. For RI,
higher values indicate better compatibility; for VOI and GCE, lower values indicate better
compatibility. Copyright (2016) IEEE.
Dataset
Jain

Aggregation

R15

D31

Pathbased

Flame

Yeast

Metrics
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges
RI
GCE
VOI
# of edges

=1
1
0
0
5412
1
0
0
16437
0.9991
0.0065
0.0452
11371
0.9991
0.0133
0.1026
120148
0.9830
0.0682
0.4023
2280
1
0
0
1785
0.9491
0.1486
0.9641
18980

=2
0.9579
0.0403
0.2534
2658
0.9973
0.0073
0.0573
7393
0.9987
0.0092
0.0520
5459
0.9980
0.0314
0.2327
42895
0.9552
0.1888
0.9804
1418
0.9834
0.0165
0.1381
1110
0.9428
0.1637
1.1682
9353

=3
0.9393
0.0594
0.3684
1509
0.9963
0.0098
0.0776
3961
0.9965
0.0257
0.1732
2881
0.9968
0.0484
0.3403
20696
0.9328
0.2884
1.3544
949
0.9834
0.0163
0.1215
702
0.8944
0.2635
1.6842
5617

’s for which all the data points are preserved. As Table 7.1 shows, even by increasing  from
1 to 3, the number of edges decreases significantly without ruining the clusters’ quality. This
means that the obtained spectral sparsifiers could preserve very well the spectral properties
of the original Laplacian matrix.
Additionally, we compare our proposed approach with the k-nearest neighbor method
over 5 data sets as shown in Table 7.2. In order for a fair comparison, we fix  to 3 and find
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Table 7.2: Comparing results of spectral sparsifiers and k-nearest neighbor graphs. Bold
indicates better performance. Copyright (2016) IEEE.
Dataset
Jain
Pathbased
Yeast
Aggregation
Flame

Algorithm
=3
k=7
=3
k=6
=3
k=6
=3
k=9
=3
k=7

RI
0.9393
0.7441
0.9328
0.5783
0.8944
0.8318
0.9963
0.9953
0.9834
1

GCE
VOI
# of edges
0.0594 0.3684
1509
0.2103 0.9479
1578
0.2884 1.3544
949
0.6206 2.9508
965
0.2635 1.6842
5617
0.3855 2.8879
6313
0.0098 0.0976
3961
0.0117 0.0835
4025
0.0163 0.1215
702
0
0
832

k that leads to almost the same number of edges in both sparsifiers. For most of the cases,
our approach was best in terms of the three metrics. To explain why this happens, we show
the Fiedler vector of the Jain data set in Fig 7.3. Figure 7.3 also shows the Fiedler vectors
of a spectral sparsifier for  = 3, and its 7-nearest neighbor graph. The spectral sparsifier
could approximate the original Fiedler vector much better than the nearest neighbor graph.

Figure 7.3: Fiedler vectors of original, spectral sparsifier and nearest neighbor graphs. Copyright (2016) IEEE.

It should be mentioned that we consider the labels obtained by applying spectral
clustering on the original data set as the ground truth labels. In fact, the goal of this research

122

work is not to improve the clustering results, but we are more interested in sparsifing a
dense original graph such that the spectral properties of its Laplacian matrix are preserved.
For instance, consider the results of the Pathbased data set in Table 7.2. In Fig 7.4, we
plot the Fiedler vector of the original graph, its 4-spectral sparsifier and 6-nearest neighbor
graph. Interestingly, the 4-spectral sparsifier with only 949 edges which is 50 times less than
the number of edges of the fully connected original graph (

312
2



) can closely approximate

the Fiedler vector of the original graph. Also, we plot the clustering results of applying
spectral clustering on the original graph, its spectral sparsifier and k-nearest neighbor graph.
Although one might argue that the clustering result of k-nearest neighbor graph is visually
better than the spectral sparsifier, however the clustering result of the spectral sparsifier is
more compatible with the result on the original graph.
In addition, Fig 7.5 shows the Fiedler vectors of spectral sparsifiers for  = 1, 2, 3
and k-nearest neighbor for k = 10, 20, 30 for the Jain dataset. As we can see, although they
result in the same partitions, the Fiedler vectors of the spectral sparsifiers for different 
are almost identical compared to the k-nearest neighbor method which is sensitive to the
parameter k.

123

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 7.4: Clustering of original, spectral sparsifier and nearest neighbor graphs. a) Fiedler
vector of the original graph, its spectral sparsifier for  = 3 and its 6-nearest neighbor graph,
b) clustering result for the original graph, c) clustering results for the spectral sparsifier, d)
clustering results for the nearest neighbor graph. Copyright (2016) IEEE.

(a)

(b)

Figure 7.5: Fiedler vectors of spectral sparsifiers versus nearest neighbor graphs. a) Fiedler
vectors of different spectral sparsifiers for varying , b) Fiedler vectors of different k-nearest
neighbor graph for varying k. Copyright (2016) IEEE.
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CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSIONS

In this research work, we rigorously studied the application of game theory in scalable
unsupervised learning. First, we addressed the scalability problem of the notion of evolutionary stable strategy in game theory to cluster large amounts of data. To do so, we introduced
an important notion of how a cluster of a subgraph can be a cluster of the entire graph.
It was shown that this question is generally a coNP-hard problem from a game theoretic
perspective. Hence, we moderated the definition of a cluster from a stable concept (ESS)
to a non-stable but optimal one (Nash equilibrium) that makes it computationally practical
for graphs with a large number of vertices. Based on this observation, we proposed a chunk
based approach for large graph clustering to make the space requirement tractable. Each
subgraph was treated as a separate data chunk and its clusters were obtained by searching
the solution space efficiently. Then, the obtained clusters were merged. Finally, vertices are
assigned to the clusters obtained using a linear game theoretic relation. The application of
the proposed approach to maximum weight clique problem and image segmentation was also
discussed and the results were comparable to the state of the art. The method provides a
parallel framework to reduce the time and space complexity.
Another way to ease the computational and memory complexities is by means of
sparsifying the similarity matrix in some respect. Since the spectral clustering algorithms
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work with the spectral properties of the graph Laplacian matrix, we are interested in a
sparsification method that preserves the spectral properties of the Laplacian with some
approximation guarantees. Hence, in this dissertation, we adopted spectral sparsification by
sampling using effective resistance to sparsify the graph Laplacian. We showed that using
this approach, the Fiedler vector of the sparsified graph provides a good approximation of
the Fiedler vector of the original graph even when the sampling rate is low. The rand index
is always at about 0.9 to 0.99 in our experiments, even when lots of sparsification is done.
In our work, we also introduced a novel concept for clustering uncertain data based
on graph and game theory. We transformed an uncertain clustering problem with interval
values as the similarities between the objects into an uncertain clustering game with interval
values as the payoffs between the strategies. We showed that the game theoretical solutions
provide stable clusters even in the presence of severe uncertainties. Contrary to ensemble
clustering approaches where the results of different similarity matrices are combined, we
focus on the average utilities obtained by the modeled uncertain clustering game. Using this
interpretation, we are able to investigate the way that the uncertainties affect the notion of a
cluster. We developed an evolutionary game theoretic dynamics to extract subsets of vertices
with the highest cluster degrees. Examples illustrating the utility of the approach were given.
Important properties of the obtained distribution of degrees were also established.
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